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ABSTRACT 
 This dissertation examines the determinants of competition and consumer access 
in the health care market, and supply- and demand-side determinants of health care use 
under the Affordable Care Act (ACA). 
The first essay studies insurer entry into the federally-facilitated health insurance 
market under the ACA. Motivated by the fact that insurers’ service areas can be subsets 
of rating areas, and the substantial variation in plan composition within a rating area, I 
explore variations in the type of plans offered and insurers’ decisions to enter a rating 
area. I find that availability of medical providers, population size, and metropolitan status 
are important in insurers’ decisions to enter a rating area. Medical cost affects the entry of 
restricted network plans. 
The second essay examines how supply-side incentives affect treatment choice for 
depression. Using claims data from Florida’s Medicaid program, I find large variations in 
initiating antidepressant treatment among newly diagnosed patients with three plan types: 
Fee-for-Service (FFS), Primary Care Case Management (PCCM) and Accountable Care 
Organizations (ACOs). Compared to FFS, PCCMs and ACOs are more likely to provide 
antidepressant treatment but no office-based care to patients with a depression 
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diagnosis. I use the control function approach to mitigate the self-selection problem and 
find that ACOs tend to use lower cost medication options. Despite the use of low-cost 
alternatives for ACOs, no differences are found in subsequent psychiatric hospitalization 
or emergency room visits among plans. Different provider contractual relationships may 
partially explain treatment choice differences. 
The third essay investigates whether the ACA policy of free preventive services affects 
utilization of preventive care. I use variation in commercially-insured enrollees to 
examine the demand and supply prices of four preventive services. Despite an average 53 
percentage point decrease in demand prices for these services, actual service use only 
increased by 17 percent from 2007 to 2011, possibly due to little or no change in prices 
paid to providers. Using risk adjustment tools to predict and control for patient 
underlying health status, I find similar changes in demand prices and rates of service use 
across six health plan types, consistent with preventive visits being provider rather than 
consumer choices. 
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Chapter 1: Insurer Participation in Federally Facilitated Health Insurance 
Marketplaces: A Closer Look at Within Rating Area Entry Decisions  
Jointly with Calvin Luscombe and Wenjia Zhu 
 
1.1 Introduction 
The Affordable Care Act mandated the establishment of health insurance 
marketplaces (HIMs) starting January 1st 2014. These marketplaces were created with 
the intention of providing health insurance access for everyone across the United States, 
driving down insurance premiums through competition and ensuring that health insurance 
plans meet minimum quality standards. Each state was given the choice to either create 
its own state-run marketplace or to use the marketplace established and run by the federal 
government. Thirty-four states ultimately either did not meet the deadline or chose not to 
establish their own marketplaces for the 2014 market place. States could further choose to 
divide their marketplaces into one or more rating areas, each of which is a collection of 
counties, and within which price regulation and risk redistribution policies applied. 
Insurer participation and consumer access are important components in assessing the 
efficacy of these health marketplaces.  While regulations are focused on aggregated goals 
for a rating area, such as ensuring all insurers offer several standardized value plans in 
each rating area they participate in, insurers are still free to make county-level entry 
decisions. Examining county level data indicates substantial within rating area 
heterogeneity in insurer entry and plan offers. The focus of this chapter is to explore 
insurer’s entry patterns in the federally facilitated HIMs within rating areas. 
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To understand insurer entry decisions, one must first understand the health 
insurance purchasing process. Health insurance plans vary in many dimensions. 
Consumers pay monthly premiums regardless of their service use. Upon requiring 
medical attention, they can seek services from medical providers and may pay a fraction 
of or fixed cost for the services. This amount, known as the consumer cost share, may 
vary depending on the service and/or medical provider. Furthermore, plans can restrict 
consumer choice of medical provider by only offering to pay for services at particular 
providers, known as a restricted network, or by requiring consumers to pay substantially 
more to visit non-preferred providers, often referred to as tiered plans.  
ACA regulations established product standardization regulation to help ease the 
burden of consumer purchasing decisions. To facilitate comparing the amount of cost 
share between plans, these regulations require plans to be categorized into metal tier 
categories based on the expected percentage of medical costs paid by the insurer. The 
metal category corresponds to actuarial value targets and any plan offered in the 
exchange must fall within 2% of one of these targets according to a standardized actuarial 
value calculator. That is, the plan’s cost share design must result in covering within 2% 
of the target percentage of costs for a typical American consumer.  This standardization 
restricts heterogeneity in cost share structure, helping to narrow information a consumer 
needs to consider when choosing what plan to purchase. Health insurance plans still have 
room to vary their cost share structure along other dimensions, such as network structure, 
in order to differentiate their products.  
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Plans can be categorized based on how much they restrict consumer choice of 
providers. Plan network generosity can be as restrictive as only offering coverage for a 
specific set of providers, otherwise known as exclusive provider organizations (EPO), or 
as generous as offering consumers complete choice over providers, plans typically 
referred to as preferred provider option (PPO) or point of service (POS) plans. 
Cost-sharing design and network generosity are important features consumers 
must compare in addition to premiums when selecting health insurance. Plan premium 
schedules must be set at the rating area level and thus may not vary between counties of a 
single rating area. Plan entry, on the other hand, is less restricted. Conditional on offering 
at least one gold and one silver plan, insurers are free to offer as many plans as they wish 
to whatever subsets of counties they choose.  
In addition to network and service generosity, plans can differentiate in the 
geographic areas they serve. It is the within-rating-area entry decision that we explore 
throughout this chapter. Figure 1 illustrates the decision making process of a typical 
insurer participating in a state’s marketplace. First, an insurer chooses which rating areas 
to serve. Second, the insurer chooses which counties within the rating area to enter. 
Finally, the insurer decides which plans to offer in each of the rating areas’ counties.   
Exploration of plan offers indicates substantial heterogeneity along each of the 
discussed dimensions. As an illustrative example of the extent of variation in insurer 
participation within rating areas, we consider four of Texas’s rating areas (3, 10, 13 and 
19) presented graphically in Figure 1.2. Tallying the number of insurers participating 
each map represents a one of Texas rating areas. Some rating areas, such as rating area 
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13, exhibit no within-rating-area variation in insurer participation. All insurers 
participating in rating area 13’s marketplace also offer plans in each county of the rating 
area. However, in rating area 3 for example, while most insurers fully participate, there 
are two insurers that opted out of two counties. Rating areas with many counties, such as 
rating area 19, often exhibit more complicated patterns where entry is concentrated in few 
counties. Half of the counties have only two insurer participants while one county has 
five insurer’s participants.  
In addition to within rating area variations in insurer participation, there is also a 
variation in the menus of plans offered by insurers. Pennsylvania’s 6th rating area is a 
good example of the wide variation observed with insurers. Figure 3 shows the 
composition of silver plans offered by three insurers in this rating area. Each letter refers 
to a unique plan offered in each county. The first insurer, Capital Blue Cross, offers their 
full menu in each of the rating area’s counties. The second insurer, Highmark Health 
Insurance Company, offers the majority of their plans uniformly across all counties but 
targets a few plans to a highly populated county, or designs county specific plans offering 
no more than 50% of their plans in any one county. The third insurer, Highmark Health 
Services, offers four silver plans throughout the rating area but no county has all the plans 
by the third insurer. Plan C is completely offered to all counties. Plan B is offered to all 
except for two counties in the left corner wherein Plan A is offered instead. Lastly, plan 
D is exclusively offered only in one county. As the metal tiers are directly linked to 
expected costs, for some of our analysis, we restrict our attention to Silver plans, those 
with an actuarial value target of 70% because insurer must offer at least one and these are 
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the plans that are most heavily subsidized for a typical customer. Specifically, ACA 
regulations include income-based discounts on silver plan premiums, and low-income 
enrollees may be eligible for additional cost sharing subsidies, but only if they enroll in a 
silver plan.  
The heterogeneity in entry structure sheds light on why rating area aggregated 
measures can differ from county aggregated measures. Aggregate estimates mask these 
heterogeneities and may be misleading when assessing market performance. We focus on 
the following two research questions: (Q1) what factors are associated with a higher 
likelihood that insurers enter a county, given they enter the rating area?  and (Q2) what 
factors are associated with the types of plans offered by insurers in the counties they 
enter? For 80% insurer-rating area, these questions are mute as complete uniform entry is 
the most common entry pattern across the Federal Health Exchanges. So instead we focus 
on the other 20% of rating areas that have incomplete entry by insurers. We will examine 
these two questions in areas where insurers make incomplete entry within the rating area. 
For robustness, we present results for the whole sample, finding similar but weaker 
patterns.  
Furthermore, we perform the same analysis separately for insurers by their 
incumbent status and for-profit status. Insurers in the HIMs differ in their previous 
experience with state’s individual market prior to the ACA and plan entry by incumbents 
is likely based off of more accurate cost estimates and established services networks, 
while truly new entrants may be less informed. Non-profit status is accompanied by a 
different set of rules that insurers must follow and for many, specifically for Consumer 
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Operated and Oriented Plans (CO-OPs), the federal government subsidized health plans 
through low interest loans. It is of great policy interest to evaluate how successful these 
CO-OPs are in offering affordable, consumer-friendly and high quality health insurance 
options as was their purpose.  
Access to health insurance is not the same as access to health services. Access to 
medical services requires both a health insurance plan and a medical provider. The 
availability of medical providers has a direct effect on the cost of providing health 
insurance though the bargained reimbursement rates that insurers pay providers. For 
example, insurers offering plans in geographic areas where there are few medical 
providers may be forced to pay higher prices to these providers for serving their 
customers than they would pay for the same services in areas where there are many 
providers. The choice of where to offer health plans certainly takes into account the 
availability of providers to contract with. Conditioning on various factors, we look at the 
relationship between entry and county characteristics finding interesting relationships 
between entry composition and county demographics.  
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 1.2, we briefly describe 
the dataset and methodology used for the analysis. Section 1.3 provides descriptive 
analysis on insurer entry. Section 1.4 presents our main results from the logistic model 
with random effects. Section 1.5 concludes the chapter and offers policy implications of 
our findings. 
1.2 Data and Methodology 
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We utilize a number of sources to create a dataset of plan offers in the 395 rating 
areas encompassing the 34 Federal-Facilitated Health Insurance Marketplaces, along with 
county-level demographic measures and county average medical cost1. The 142 rating 
areas that consist of only one county are excluded from analysis, as within rating area 
variation cannot exist in single-county rating areas. Our remaining sample includes 
insurers who participate in the 253 multi-county rating areas resulting in a total of 892 
insurer-rating area level observations. To give a first glimpse of how estimates using 
aggregate rating area data can differ from measures at county level we present a 
comparison of summary population weighted summary statistics, between rating area 
level and county level data in Table 1.1 to a similar summary table in  Dafny, Gruber, and 
Ody (2015). 
1.2.1 Key dependent variable and independent variables 
Data is compiled from a variety of sources. Primarily, we obtain plan information 
from the website for the Federally-Facilitated Health Insurance Marketplaces-www. 
healthcare.gov. The plan level data contains detail including insurer name, plan metal 
tier, network generosity, areas (state, rating area, county) where a plan is offered, and 
plan’s reference premium for a 27-year-old. Our key dependent variables are an indicator 
for plan entry at the county level and an indicator for insurer entry at the county level. 
Plan premiums for other ages and family structure can be calculated applying a multiplier 
                                                 
1 We exclude dental plans and plans for OB in Virginia because these plans have cost sharing features 
significantly differ than the rest insurance options and depend heavily on only a specific small set of 
services plans cover. 
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to the base premium (27-year-old) according to state specific age curve. Therefore, the 
27-year-old reference premium is a sufficient statistic to capture premium variation. For 
each sub market (rating area, county), we follow Dafny et al. (2014) and focus 
specifically on the second lowest premium plan silver plan, as federal subsidies are 
calculated of the second lowest plans price, so these plans’ premium directly affects the 
federal income-based subsidy for enrollees of all plans in the area. 
We supplement our plan dataset with information on insurers using data reported 
by the Center for Consumer Information and Insurance Oversight (CCIIO). The data 
contains identifiers of insurers that participated in state-level individual markets prior to 
the ACA and the for-profit status of existing insurers. We obtain the list of newly-
approved nonprofit Consumer Operated and Oriented Plans (CO-OPs) from the same 
website.  
We draw additional controls to reflect county-level demographics and medical 
expenditures. County-level demographics (population, median household income, 
proportion of minorities) are obtained from the most current version of Area Health 
Resource Files (AHRF, 2010). Because we anticipate the availability of medical 
providers to be an important determinant of the insurers’ plan entry decision, we use 
AHRF data to generate two measures of a county’s resources of health care providers. 
The first is an indicator for whether a county has one or fewer hospitals. Second, we 
generate a measure for the shortage of primary care physicians (PCPs) based om a pre-
established ratio of PCPs per capita in each county. This variable is an indicator for 
whether or not the entire county is classified as having a shortage of primary care 
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physicians (PCP)2. We also use data from the US Department of Agriculture’s Economic 
Research Service 2013 (USDA, ERS 2013) to construct variables indicating urban vs. 
rural areas for each count because health services are harder to obtain in rural 
environments. Finally, we use enrollment-weighted per-capita average annual medical 
costs at the county level to capture geographic variation in costs. Cost estimates are 
derived from the Truven Health Analytics MarketScan® Research Databases using claims 
and enrollment files from 2007 to 2010 (MarketScan 2007-2010)3. To reflect the cost 
distribution within a rating area, we further construct a dummy variable indicating 
whether a county’s medical cost is in the bottom 25th percentile of the cost distribution 
among counties in the rating area. If an insurer selectively enters into areas where people 
are healthier and have lower costs, then this variable will pick up such variation.  
We take note that our medical cost estimates have limitations. We have used per 
capita truncated annual medical spending at the county level to measure geographic 
variations in health care costs and this measure is imprecise for several reasons. First of 
all, the MarketScan database consists of people who are commercially insured in 
employer-sponsored health insurance, which may not be representative of the population 
of interest on the exchange market. Second, our measure may suffer from lack of power 
                                                 
2 A geographic area will be designated as having a shortage of primary medical care professionals if the 
following three criteria are met: 
The area is a rational area for the delivery of primary medical services.  
One of the following conditions prevails within the area: 1) The area has a population to full-time-
equivalent primary care physician ratio of at least 3,500:1. 2) The area has a population to full-time-
equivalent primary care physician ratio of less than 3,500:1 but greater than 3,000:1 and has unusually high 
needs for primary care services or insufficient capacity of existing primary care providers.  
Primary medical care professionals in contiguous areas are overutilized, excessively distant or inaccessible 
to the population of the area under consideration.  
 
3 See detailed description on construction of cost estimates in the Data Appendix.  
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because of sample size issues. The number of enrollees in each county-year cell ranges 
from 1 to 1339202. In each year, the bottom 10% of counties has around 300 or fewer 
enrollees based on whom to calculate the per-capita annual medical costs Because of 
these limitations, one should be careful when drawing inference from our cost measure.  
1.2.2 Additional Sample constructed for regression analysis 
For the regression analysis, we construct two datasets to address our two research 
questions respectively. For Q1, what factors are associated with a higher likelihood that 
insurers enter a county, given they enter the rating area. We first create a panel dataset at 
insurer-county level, sample 1. The dependent variable is an indicator for insurer entry.  
Since Q1 is trying to understand insurers’ preference over counties when they are not 
entering everywhere in the rating area, we restrict the sample to only include insurers 
who engage in incomplete entry in a rating area. For Q2, we construct a panel dataset at 
insurer-plan-county level, sample 2. Similarly, the dependent variable is an indicator for 
plan entry. For this analysis we limit our sample to plans that are not offered in all 
counties served by the insurer offering them. An important distinction between these two 
samples is the set of insurers included in each sample. For example, insurers can enter a 
subset of a rating area’s counties offering the same menu of plans to each. Such an 
insurer will be included in sample 1 but not in sample 2. Alternatively, an insurer can 
choose to enter into each county of a rating area but may vary their plan menus by 
county. These insurers will be excluded from sample 1 and included in sample 2. We will 
refer to insurers in sample 1 as non-uniform entrants and plans in sample 2 as non-
uniform plan offers. 
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For the remainder of the chapter, samples include only observations with 
incomplete entry, samples 1 and 2, will be referred to as restricted samples. All analyses 
based on the restricted data will be referred to as “Conditional” estimates. That is 
conditional on non-uniform entry. Unless otherwise specified, all estimates will use 
sample 1 or sample 2. Unconditional estimates are reported in the appendix for 
robustness.   
1.2.3 Methodology  
We start by examining what county attributes predict insurers entry given the fact 
they do not enter everywhere in the county. More specifically, we estimate the following 
equations using restricted insurer-county level data:  
 
𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑠 = 𝑋𝑗𝑘𝑠𝛽 + 𝑢𝑖 + 𝑣𝑘 + 𝑐𝑠 + 𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑘                      (Eq1) 
𝑦𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑘 = 𝑋𝑗𝑘𝑠𝛽 + 𝑢𝑖 + 𝑣𝑘 + 𝑐𝑠 + 𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑘                     (Eq2) 
The dependent variable, 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑘, equals one if insurer i enters county j in rating area 
k state s and zero otherwise (𝑦𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑘 is one if plan p from insurer i is offered in county j in 
rating area k in state s)4. The county level demographic explanatory variables of interest 
are included in 𝑋𝑗𝑘𝑠. To account for correlations in errors, we model the error terms in 
various specifications. Specifically, we account for correlation in errors among insurers, 
rating areas and states. Our main results report the estimate from the model where we 
account for random effects on all three levels: insurer, rating area and state, to control the 
                                                 
4 We assign each of 253 rating area with a unique identifier. Thus a state is purely a grouping of rating 
areas. 
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inter-correlations within sate and rating areas. As a robustness check, we also estimate 
the above equations using an insurer-rating area level random effects model, a fixed 
effects model on insurer-rating area level, as well as a mixed effects model (random 
effect on insurer level and fixed effect on rating area). The results from these robustness 
checks are similar to those in the main analysis; only the magnitudes are slightly 
different. Because performance of logistic models is tempered if too many dummy 
variables are included, we report estimates from the random effects model.  
1.3 Analysis and Results  
1.3.1 Summary statistics related to entry by insurer’s type  
We begin by looking at insurer’s entry behavior and asking where insurers enter 
within a rating area. Table 1.2 summarizes insurer-rating area level entry statistics for 
each insurer, incumbent and new entrants, for profit and not for profits, and CO-OPs 
conditional on incomplete entry. Overall, rating areas are composed of an average of 11.7 
counties. Insurers entered 76% of rating areas counties. Insurers offer an average of 10 
plans per rating area with more than one third of all plans offered in the Silver metal tier. 
The average monthly premium of Silver Plans are around $253, though there is 
substantial geographic heterogeneity. The county average annual medical cost is lightly 
less than $2500 per enrollee. Comparing annual primus to annual medical costs indicates 
that, absent administrative costs, premiums should be more than sufficient to cover 
average medical costs. The difference between estimated medical costs may reflect high 
administrative costs, a poor cost measure, high markups or risk aversion on behalf of 
insurers who are uncertain about the expected costs of providing health insurance to 
13 
 
consumers in this new market. The table also shows huge variations across different 
insurer types along many dimensions. For-profits generally serve larger rating area with 
more population while offering fewer plans than their non-profit counterparts. Although 
they serve in areas with larger amount of counties, for-profits tend to serve fewer 
counties (71%). In comparison, nonprofits and especially CO-OPs enter more than 80% 
of the rating area. It is worth highlighting that CO-OP insurers offer Silver plans with 
substantially higher premiums than other insurer types. This is consistent with our 
observation that CO-OP insurers are the least likely to offer silver plans with the second 
lowest premium in the rating area. Higher premiums by CO-OPs may partially result 
from CO-OPs covering more counties in a rating area. Because by serving a larger 
uninsured population, CO-OPs are likely to include bad risk enrollees with higher 
medical cost which may raise premiums. Indeed, our cost estimates support such 
hypothesis since per capita medical cost is 7% higher for CO-OPs than for for-profits. 
Incumbent and new insurers exhibit similar patterns in all dimensions except that new 
insurers tend to enter rating areas with fewer counties but with higher population density. 
New insurers cover slightly larger shares of counties in a rating area. 
Once we look at the entire insurers group, regardless of whether they enter every 
county in a rating area or not, the differences across insurer types become diluted. Still, 
insurers that differ in their for-profit status show larger variations on entry characteristics 
than those categorized by whether or not they are new entrants to the exchanges market. 
More details are provided in Table 1.2A in the appendix. 
1.3.2 Summary statistics related to plan offering by insurer’s type 
14 
 
Having seen the significant differences in insurer entry behavior, i.e., choosing 
which counties to enter as shown in the Figure 1.1, we go on to ask what set of plans do 
insurers choose to offer in each county. We are further interested to see whether insurers 
of different type offer different plan types and offer them in different manners. In 
particular, we focus on how plans offered by insurers of distinct type differ in their 
generosity in benefit coverage and provider network. 
Figure 1.4-A provides an overall picture of the prevalence of different metal/plan 
types that are offered within a rating area for an average insurer in HIMs. The left panel 
in Figure 1.3-a shows average number of plans offered at each metal level. The right 
panel corresponds to plans at each plan type. Overall, Silver and Gold are most common 
plans offered in HIMs. PPOs, as measured by plan’s generosity in provider networks, are 
the most common plan type, followed by HMOs. In Figure 1.4-b, we restrict the sample 
to only those insurers who offer one or some of the metal/plan types of interest. 
Conditional on insurers offering each metal type, an average insurer offers 3.5 silver, 3 
bronze, 2.7 gold, 1.7 platinum, and 1.2 catastrophic plans. In addition, bronze and silver 
plans are most likely to completely enter in a rating area. This means that if a Bronze or 
Silver plan is offered, they are likely to be offered everywhere within a rating area. 
Figure 1.4-a also shows the variation of plan offers that differ in their network 
arrangements. Clearly, the more generous the plan’s network arrangement is, the more 
likely it is going to completely enter. PPOs, for example, tend to offer consumers more 
flexibility to choose providers from a relatively large network. Given insurers have 
already contracted with a relatively large set of providers who may cover larger 
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proportion of the population, it is reasonable to offer PPOs to larger population (in this 
case, the entire rating area). EPO plans, on the other hand, offer an exclusive network of 
providers, and therefore it is in an insurer’s best interest to contract with providers that 
can accept a lower fee schedule. Insurers therefore have incentive to only serve 
consumers living close enough to these low cost providers.  
Table 1.3 further examines plan offers by looking separately at different insurers. 
We can see that again, much larger variation is observed if insurers are categorized by 
their for-profit status than by whether or not they are new entrants to the market. Panel A 
summarizes the proportion of plans offered at different metal level and with different 
network arrangement. Overall, insurers offer similar menu of plans in terms of metal 
level. Notice that CO-OPs offer slightly more Gold and Platinum and fewer catastrophic 
plan than the rest of insurers. In terms of network arrangement, new insurers offer 
exclusively more EPOs and HMOs, while CO-OPs offer more PPOs on average. Panel B 
in Table 1.3 shows the average proportion of plans that are not offered everywhere within 
a rating area. We can see that incumbent and for-profit insurers are the ones that offer the 
highest proportion of plans associated with incomplete entry among all insurer types. On 
the other hand, the CO-OP insurers offer the majority of their plans to the entire rating 
area. This is especially true for POS plans. CO-OPs offer almost all plans of this type 
everywhere within a rating area. 
1.4 Relationship between county-level characteristics and insurer entry decisions 
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1.4.1 What factors predict an insurer’s decision to enter a given county? Are entry 
decisions driven by medical cost or availability of provider in the local 
market? 
We estimate the equation 1 to access the above question by various model 
specifications. Odds ratios from logistic models with insurer and rating area level random 
effects are presented in Table 1.4. Each column list estimates from a separate regression 
with the same set of controls included. The first column predicts the probability of entry 
among all insurers on a set of county characteristics. Interestingly, being in the bottom 
25th percentile of the medical cost distribution in a rating area barely affects the odds of 
insurer entry. If our cost estimates are close to the actual cost in these HIMs, this could 
suggest insurers have not engaged in cream skimming. It may also suggest that insurers 
may not have sufficient cost information about previously uninsured in these new 
markets as this is first year that HIMs establish, therefore do not make entry decision 
based on cost. If the risk adjustment system HIMs adopts is well designed, it may further 
prevent insurer from cream skimming. The next two rows are our main measures of 
provider availability. If a county has fewer than two hospitals, the odds that an insurer 
will enter is significantly reduced. Similarly, shortages of primary care physicians are 
also associated with decreased odds of insurer entry although not significant. In addition, 
metropolitan, population and median household income all have significantly positive 
effects on entry. In other words, this could mean less condensed rural areas are likely to 
have fewer entries. Since higher median income may be a proxy for consumer’s ability to 
purchase, it should affect insurer decision to entry. Large populations in a metropolitan 
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area can exhibit both high demand for both insurance and health care, and more 
consumer preference heterogeneity for health plans, which would trigger insurer entry. 
Lastly, the proportion of minorities does not significantly affect the odds of entry.  
Columns 2-5 present estimates from a separate regression for each type of 
insurers respectively. Overall, median house income is one of the main drivers of entry 
for all insurers. Higher population density and urban status significantly increases the 
odds of entry for all insurers except for non-profits. As nonprofits, especially CO-OPs, 
are designed to be more consumer friendly, their entry decision may be expected to be 
less closely related to specific county demographics, such as population density and 
urban or share of minorities. Lastly, for counties with low cost, the odds that new insurers 
will enter are 1.44 times higher than the rest of the counterparts.  
1.4.2 What factors predict an insurer’s decision to offer certain types of plans to 
specific counties given entry? 
In Figure 1.3, we show that even if insurers enter everywhere in a rating area, they 
can still offer different amount of plans with different designs with respect to cost sharing 
features as well as network arrangements across counties. If a plan is not offered 
everywhere in a rating area, we call it “incomplete plan entry” or “incomplete entry” for 
brevity. As shown in Table 1.3, incomplete entry is commonly seen for Catastrophic, 
Platinum, EPO and HMO plans. Hence, we focus our analysis specifically on these four 
types of plans. Marginal effects from logistic regression for each type are reported in 
Table 1.5.  The first column predicts the log of odds insurer offer a Catastrophic plan in a 
given county. Marginal effects for almost all controls remain the same as in Table 1.4 
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column 1. This means larger population size, metropolitan status and higher median 
household income are still the main drivers for insurers to offer catastrophic plans.  
Similar as before, having fewer hospitals per county is negatively associated with plan 
entry.  Having a shortage of primary care physicians, on the other hand, now has an 
opposite sign, though the result is not significantly different than zero.  
When we turn to look at entry of Platinum plans, decision of entry is negatively 
correlated with average medical cost of population in a given county.  Being the most 
generous plans in benefit coverage covering at least 90% of enrollee’s medical cost, it is 
sensible to offer Platinum plans only to low cost population.  
Column three shows similar results for EPOs. Notice now effects of low medical 
cost, measure of hospital resource and metropolitan status are much larger in magnitude. 
In order for an EPO plan to be able to contract with exclusive set of provider, there must 
be, in the first place, enough potential providers available in an area. Therefore, a 
shortage of hospitals significantly decreases the odds of plan entry for a given county. 
Because resources tend to concentrate in metropolitan areas, it explains the positive 
correlation between EPO entry and metropolitan status.  Positive correlation between low 
cost and EPO entry stems from two possibilities. First, EPOs tends to enter areas with 
large pool of providers, who may lead more competition result in lower medical cost in 
that area. Second, if our estimates are accurately predicting the uninsured cost, the results 
may indicate that there is cream skimming among EPOs. 
Finally, column four presents the results for HMOs. Since both HMOs and EPOs 
are less generous in their network arrangement, measures of low cost, shortage in hospital 
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and urbanity remain the same sign. The smaller magnitude can partially result from the 
fact HMOs are relatively more generous than EPOs and therefore provider availability 
might have a smaller impact on plan entry. Interestingly, as primary care physicians are 
widely used in HMOs as gatekeepers (making referrals only when necessary) a shortage 
of primary care physicians significantly reduces the probability that HMOs will be 
offered.  
Although the proportion of black patients in a population is positively associated 
with Platinum and HMO plan entry, the effect is small. The share of Latino patients in the 
population, on the other hand, decreases the odds of entry in almost all cases (except for 
platinum). 
1.5 Conclusion 
In this study, we examine insurer entry strategies in the federally facilitated HIMs. 
We found insurers’ ultimate serving areas in 30% cases do not match the market area, 
meaning that insurers do not enter everywhere in the rating area. Furthermore, even if 
insurers serve the entire rating area, some of them offer different sets of plans with 
different cost sharing structures and network arrangement across counties. In this chapter, 
we call both these strategies as incomplete entry. (The latter is also called incomplete 
plan entry).  
Using county-level demographic information, we find that insurers engaged in 
incomplete entry generally enter counties with large populations and higher income and 
more often locate in a metropolitan area. New insurers tend to selectively enter counties 
with more hospital resources and lower medical cost relative to the rest of counties in the 
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rating area. In terms of plan entry, insurers tend to offer plans in counties where more 
providers are available. It is especially true for EPOs and HMOs who make restrictive 
choices of providers. Because medical costs tend to be lower when more providers are 
present, this can partially explain our finding of insurers offering Platinum, EPO and 
HMOs in low cost counties within a rating area. Of course, low cost can also mean 
consumers in those counties are generally healthier. If insurers are only serving low cost 
populations because consumers are healthier, the data support the hypothesis that insurers 
are cream skimming. Due to potential endogeneity in our estimation and limitation in our 
cost estimates, we are not confident to assert that entry decisions are driven by the 
incentive to cream skim.  
Because the federal government has spent substantial financial resources to 
support of subsidies on CO-OPs, we now provide a basic evaluation of these newly 
approved, federally supported nonprofit CO-OPs. In comparison with rest of insurers, 
CO-OPs overall are less likely to have incomplete entry. Their entry decisions are not 
significantly correlated with common county demographics, such as medical cost 
population, metropolitan status. This suggests that CO-OPs are not intentionally avoiding 
rural populations. In fact, among 12 states that have CO-OPs, more than 85% all counties 
are served by CO-OPs. In terms of affordability, we see in Table 1.2, average monthly 
premiums of CO-OPs are higher (roughly 20 in percentage term at most) than the rest 
insurers. There are three reasons. First, premiums partially reflect higher medical costs of 
potential consumers that CO-OPs will serve. It can also because CO-OPs plans tend to be 
more generously in the network arrangement.  Finally, CO-OPs also depend on its 
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profitability to repay federal loans. To sum up, CO-OPs, by offering proportionally more 
Platinum and PPOs, seem to be aligned with their goals to provide consumers friendly 
and high quality health options. Whether CO-OPs will succeed in achieving the intended 
program depends on the actual performance of plans that they offer. 
Equally important, if not more important, is the consequence of incomplete entry, 
i.e., the impact on consumers’ accessibility to insurance and to health care at a local 
market. Heterogeneity in numbers of participating insurers within rating areas leads to 
variations in local competition among insurers. Our results confirm the previous finding 
of Dafny, Gruber, and Ody (2015): premiums are negatively correlated with competition. 
Concerns may rise as to whether premiums in counties with lower insurers entry will be 
higher than the rest of counties in the same rating area. In addition, less insurers 
participation may not necessary mean less access to care, and answering that question is 
beyond the scope of this analysis Ultimately, we conclude that there is heterogeneity in 
insurer entry and in plans offered, and that consumers may therefore face different sets of 
insurance choices and with corresponding different levels of care access.  
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Table 1.1 Summary Statistics of Federally Facilitated Health Insurance Marketplaces 
 Rating Area 
Level 
County 
Level 
Difference 
in % 
Number of Insurers 4.60 4.00 -13% 
(2.34) (2.21)  
    Number of New Insurers 1.55 1.36 -12% 
 (1.39) (1.33)  
    Share of Rating Areas with Insurers 
Fewer Than Two  
0.23 0.29 26% 
(0.42) (0.45)  
    Number of Plans  52.82 47.00 -11% 
(31.93) (31.98)  
    Number of Silver Plans 17.90 15.85 -11% 
(11.01) (10.94)  
    Share of Plans Offered by Nonprofits 
(NP) 
0.51 0.53 4% 
(0.29) (0.30)  
    Price of Second Lowest Cost Silver Plan 215.98 218.28 1% 
(36.84) (37.92)  
Observations 395 2512  
Note: This table is a replication of Table 1 in Dafny et al (2014). Statistics are slightly different than 
original table because we exclude child-only plans, plans with only dental coverage and plans for Morbid 
Obesity (MO) resulting in a different sample than the original table. Our statistics are weighted by 
uninsured population whereas statistics, from original table are population weighted. 
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Table 1.2 Insurer-Rating Area Summary Statistics by Insurer Type Conditional on 
Incomplete Entry 
 All Incumbent New CO-OPs Other 
Nonprofits 
For-
profit 
Average Population 
in Serving Counties 
182.25 159.76 219.61 136.50 152.18 182.25 
(297.86) (252.70) (358.11) (176.85) (246.57) (297.86) 
Counties in a Rating 
Area 
11.71 
(22.70) 
12.69 
(22.22) 
10.08 
(23.44) 
9.52 
(7.72) 
11.00 
(20.54) 
13.58 
(22.68) 
       Share of Counties 
Insurer Enters 
0.76 0.75 0.77 0.84 0.82 0.71 
(0.32) (0.33) (0.31) (0.28) (0.31) (0.33) 
       Share of MSA 
Insurer Enters 
0.80 0.79 0.82 0.91 0.84 0.76 
(0.33) (0.34) (0.31) (0.27) (0.32) (0.35) 
Number of Plans  10.38 10.20 10.68 11.09 12.34 8.94 
 (8.08) (7.59) (8.85) (6.83) (7.02) (7.59) 
Number of Silver 
Plans 
3.44 
(3.27) 
3.22 
(3.00) 
3.80 
(3.67) 
3.57 
(2.33) 
4.23 
(2.91) 
2.58 
(2.79) 
Average Monthly 
Premium of Silver 
Plans 
252.67 246.43 263.04 291.23 255.16 241.82 
(44.70) (39.88) (50.12) (57.22) (33.69) (42.77) 
Share of Counties 
where Insurer Owns 
Second Lowest Cost 
Silver Plan 
0.03 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.02 
(0.11) (0.10) (0.13) (0.04) (0.11) (0.09) 
       Service Area Per 
Capita Annual 
Medical Cost  
2411.78 2462.49 2327.58 2545.60 2542.39 2385.20 
(438.49) (447.23) (410.91) (482.11) (459.51) (418.46) 
Observations 588 367 221 46 166 217 
Note: Unit observation is at insurer-rating area level. Sample includes only insurers that 
participate in the Federally Facilitated Health Insurance Marketplace. Rating Areas consisting 
only one county are excluded. Observations of complete entry are also excluded.  
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Table 1.3 Insurer-County Summary Statistics of Plan Offered and Share of Incomplete 
Entry Plans by Insurer Type 
 All Incumbent New CO-OPs Other 
Nonprofits 
For-
profits 
 Panel A 
Number of Plans 10.38 10.20 10.68 11.09 12.34 8.94 
Share of Plans By Metal Level (%) 
Catastrophic  10 12 7 8 10 12 
       Bronze  28 28 28 25 27 28 
       Silver  32 30 34 34 34 32 
       Gold  26 25 28 28 27 26 
Platinum  4 5 3 6 2 4 
Share of Plans By Network Generosity (%) 
EPO  2 1 3 11 1 2 
HMO  41 40 42 16 38 41 
POS  12 15 7 10 2 12 
PPO  45 44 48 63 58 45 
 Panel B (conditional on offering plan type) 
Share of Incomplete Entry Plans By Metal Level (%) 
Catastrophic  30 34 17 18 22 42 
       Bronze  32 33 31 22 19 42 
       Silver  33 32 36 23 21 41 
       Gold  34 33 36 22 22 41 
Platinum  42 48 24 20 21 64 
Share of Incomplete Entry Plans By Network Generosity (%) 
EPO  55 84 36 38 83 87 
HMO  46 41 57 33 35 42 
POS  45 54 24 0 18 55 
PPO  16 15 17 21 5 33 
Observations 872 580 292 77 279 319 
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 Table 1.4 Likelihood of Insurer Entering a County Conditional on Incomplete Entry
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Variable =1 if 
insurer enters the county  
All Incumbent New 
Insurers 
Nonprofit For-Profit 
(n=4040) (n=2675) (n=1365) (n=795) (n=2013) 
      
Medical Cost in the 
Bottom 25 Percentile  
-0.011 -0.133 0.352* -0.175 0.028 
(0.102) (0.119) (0.199) (0.210) (0.139) 
      
Short of Hospital (n<=1) -0.293** -0.185 -0.555** -0.268 -0.152 
(0.119) (0.138) (0.231) (0.252) (0.162) 
      
Short of Primary Care 
Physicians 
-0.071 -0.062 -0.105 -0.008 -0.084 
(0.106) (0.122) (0.216) (0.212) (0.144) 
      
Population in 10,000  0.018*** 0.011*** 0.037*** 0.001 0.035*** 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.009) (0.005) (0.008) 
      
Metropolitan (2012) 0.647*** 0.544*** 0.788*** 0.435 0.502*** 
(0.138) (0.165) (0.258) (0.299) (0.190) 
      
Median Household 
Income in $10,000  
0.307*** 0.300*** 0.278** 0.219** 0.317*** 
(0.061) (0.067) (0.132) (0.112) (0.084) 
      
Percentage of Black  0.009* 0.008 0.008 0.004 0.007 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.011) (0.010) (0.006) 
      
Percentage of Hispanic or 
Latino  
-0.011** -0.008 -0.035** -0.016* -0.007 
(0.004) (0.005) (0.014) (0.009) (0.005) 
Notes: Marginal effects from random effect logistic models are reported. All regressions are based on 
observations at the insurer-county level. Sample includes only insurers that participate in the Federally 
Facilitated Health Insurance Marketplace. Rating Areas consisting only one county are excluded 
Observations of complete entry are also excluded. Dependent variable equals one if insurer i enters the 
county j in the Rating Area k and zero otherwise. Standard errors are in parenthesis.* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, 
*** p<0.01 
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Table 1.5 Likelihood of Insurer Offering a Plan in a County Conditional on Incomplete 
Plan Entry   
Dependent Variable =1 if 
insurer offers the plan in a 
county 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Catastrophic Platinum EPO HMO 
(n=3695) (n=1974) (n=1102) (n=23400) 
     
Medical Cost in the Bottom 
25 Percentile  
-0.122 0.240* 0.661*** 0.100** 
(0.101) (0.144) (0.204) (0.045) 
     
Short of Hospital (n<=1) -0.509*** -0.492*** -1.318*** -0.414*** 
(0.121) (0.172) (0.245) (0.054) 
     
Short of Primary Care 
Physicians 
0.023 -0.252 -0.036 -0.253*** 
(0.106) (0.165) (0.206) (0.048) 
     
Population in 10,000  0.013*** 0.039*** 0.004 0.022*** 
(0.003) (0.008) (0.011) (0.001) 
     
Metropolitan (2012) 0.401*** 0.137 2.072*** 0.647*** 
(0.135) (0.193) (0.331) (0.064) 
     
Median Household Income in 
$10,000  
0.314*** 0.687*** -0.225 0.373*** 
(0.064) (0.119) (0.142) (0.030) 
     
Percentage of Black  0.007 0.023*** 0.003 0.010*** 
(0.005) (0.009) (0.033) (0.002) 
     
Percentage of Hispanic or 
Latino  
-0.010* -0.010 -0.033* -0.006*** 
(0.006) (0.013) (0.019) (0.002) 
Notes: Marginal effects from random effect logistic models are reported. All regressions are based on 
observations at the insurer-plan-county level. Sample includes only insurers that participate in the 
Federally Facilitated Health Insurance Marketplace. Rating Areas consisting only one county are 
excluded. Observations of complete entry are also excluded. Dependent variable equals one if insurer i 
offers plan j in county k in Rating Area q and zero otherwise. Standard errors are in parenthesis.* 
p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Figure 1.1 Example of an Insurer’s Entry Decision 
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Figure 1.2 Numbers of Insurers Participating in the Marketplace across Counties 
 
Notes: Numbers corresponds to numbers of insurers in each county. Difference between numbers of 
insurers in each county and total number of insurers in the Rating Area is calculated and group into three 
categories as shown in the legend. Insurer’s information is collected from www.healthcare.gov/health-plan-
information. 
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Figure 1.3 Numbers of Plans Offered by Insurers across Counties 
 
Notes: Each letter represents insurer’s one unique plan. Proportion of insurer’s plan offered in each county 
is calculated and group into four categories as shown in the legend. All plan information is collected from 
www.healthcare.gov/health-plan-information  
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Figure 1.4-a Prevalence of Plans by Tier and By Network Generosity for an Average 
Insurer in HIMs 
 
Notes: Sample includes all insures participating in 34 HIMs. Plan information is collected from   
www.healthcare.gov/health-plan-information. 
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Figure 1.4-b Break Down of Entry Conditional on Offering Plan Type 
 
Notes: For each type of plans, only insurers who offer that type of plan are included. Statistics are 
calculated based on the included insurers for each plan type. 
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1.6 Appendix  
Table 1.5-A Insurer-Rating Area Summary Statistics by Insurer Type Conditional on 
Incomplete Entry 
 All Incumbent New CO-OPs Other 
Nonprofits 
For-
profit 
Average Population in 
Serving Counties 
182.25 159.76 219.61 136.50 152.18 182.25 
(297.86) (252.70) (358.11) (176.85) (246.57) (297.86) 
Counties in a Rating 
Area 
11.71 12.69 10.08 9.52 11.00 13.58 
 (22.70) (22.22) (23.44) (7.72) (20.54) (22.68) 
       Share of Counties 
Insurer Enters 
0.76 0.75 0.77 0.84 0.82 0.71 
(0.32) (0.33) (0.31) (0.28) (0.31) (0.33) 
       Share of MSA Insurer 
Enters 
0.80 0.79 0.82 0.91 0.84 0.76 
(0.33) (0.34) (0.31) (0.27) (0.32) (0.35) 
Number of Plans  10.38 10.20 10.68 11.09 12.34 8.94 
 (8.08) (7.59) (8.85) (6.83) (7.02) (7.59) 
Number of Silver Plans 3.44 3.22 3.80 3.57 4.23 2.58 
 (3.27) (3.00) (3.67) (2.33) (2.91) (2.79) 
Average Monthly 
Premium of Silver Plans 
252.67 246.43 263.04 291.23 255.16 241.82 
(44.70) (39.88) (50.12) (57.22) (33.69) (42.77) 
Share of Counties where 
Insurer Owns Second 
Lowest Cost Silver Plan 
0.03 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.02 
(0.11) (0.10) (0.13) (0.04) (0.11) (0.09) 
       Service Area Per Capita 
Annual Medical Cost  
2411.78 2462.49 2327.58 2545.60 2542.39 2385.20 
(438.49) (447.23) (410.91) (482.11) (459.51) (418.46) 
Observations 588 367 221 46 166 217 
Notes: Unit observation is at insurer-rating area level. Sample includes only insurers that 
participate in the Federally Facilitated Health Insurance Marketplace. Rating Areas consisting 
only one county are excluded. Observations of complete entry are also excluded.  
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1.7 Data Appendix  
1.7.1 Construction of cost measures 
In this section, we describe in more detail how our medical cost measures are 
constructed. To evaluate the uncertainty with respect to regional costs faced by insurers, 
we investigate geographic variations in per-capita medical spending using MarketScan 
2007-2010. The main variable of interest is the weighted per capita annual medical 
spending at county level. The cost measure is derived from the commercial claims and 
encounter information on inpatient, outpatient services, and prescription drugs utilized by 
a subset of the US population.  
The variable is constructed as follows. First, we extract eligibles with non-missing 
ids and non-missing county from the enrollment files, for each year in 2007-2010. We 
then aggregate eligibles to county level to calculate the number of enrollees in each 
county each year. These numbers form the denominators of the per-capita cost measure at 
the county level. Next, we derive county-level medical costs from claims data on 
inpatient, outpatient and prescription drugs. Specifically, we assign 0 to any claim with 
negative or missing values. Once we obtain each enrollee’s total annual medical cost (by 
adding up medical expenditures on inpatient, outpatient, and prescription drugs), we 
truncate the cost using the 95 percentiles of medical spending across the country. We 
further aggregate the cost to the county level to calculate the annual total medical 
spending for each county. With both enrollment and medical cost information ready at 
the county level, we then construct each county’s per-capita medical costs in each year. 
Finally, we construct the weighted county-level per capita annual spending by averaging 
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each county’s per-capita medical costs across 2007-2010, weighted by each year’s 
corresponding enrollment size. 
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Chapter 2: Insurers’ Influence on Treatment Choice: Evidence from the Florida 
Medicaid Program in the Case of Depression Care 
 
2.1 Introduction 
In response to roaring health care spending, Medicaid and Medicare programs are 
experimenting with diverse health plan designs and delivery models to control costs by 
steering the spending toward cost-effective medical interventions. For instance, Medicare 
has moved toward a global budget model like Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs) to 
pay for and deliver health care services through integrated and coordinated delivery 
system (Epstein et al. 2014, Lewis et al. 2013, Shortell et al. 2014). The Affordable Care 
Act (ACA) established several provisions related to Medicaid, such as ACOs, Medicaid 
Health Homes, bundled payments, and community-based collaborative care networks 
(Protection and Act 2010). Understanding which health plan designs are more effective at 
reducing health care expenditures in the public insurance markets is of particular policy 
interest.   
As consumer facing almost zero-cost sharing, Medicaid programs rely, to a large 
degree, on health care providers to make cost-effective treatment decisions to control 
costs. Common supply-side strategies include risk-sharing reimbursement scheme and 
non-payment strategies through various form of “managed care” to influence health care 
utilization and control health spending. Common non-payment strategies include: 
productivity management, tiered drug formulary, prior authorization, utilization review 
and step therapy, etc. Among recent innovations in health plan designs, of particular 
interest are ACOs, a new delivery model that is formed by groups of health care 
36 
 
providers that agree to be accountable for the quality and the cost of care delivered to a 
defined population. Payments to ACOs often use global budgets in combination with 
share savings and/or performance bonus (Medicare and Medicaid Services 2011).  
Early evidences have shown ACOs improved quality of care and reduced 
spending in the private insurance markets (Song et al. 2014) by shifting care to less 
expensive providers and by reducing treatment intensity. While cost savings and quality 
improvement are also evident in Medicare programs (Medicare and Medicaid Services 
2011, Medicare and Services 2014), early savings in Medicare ACOs were achieved 
through reductions in utilization rather than referrals to less expensive providers since 
service prices are heavily regulated and set almost uniformly under Medicare. However, 
relatively little is known about whether ACOs are effective in reducing health care 
spending and improving care coordination in Medicaid programs. It is also not clear 
whether potential savings, if any, are made through improved efficiencies or at the 
expense of needed care. To answer this question, I utilize the variation in insurers’ 
characteristics in Florida’s 2006 Medicaid Reform program to examine utilization and 
spending under different delivery models, with a specific focus on a pilot delivery model 
that share many attributes to ACOs.  
Many early findings of ACOs focus on modeling overall health spending such as 
per person annual spending by aggregating diverse treatment decisions and diseases. 
Limited information is available on how ACOs affect care for disaggregated diseases, 
especially for those that are particularly poorly coordinated under traditional Fee-For-
Service (FFS) arrangements, and thus may have the greatest potential to benefit from 
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integrated primary and specialty care under ACOs. Service level selection also highlights 
the importance to evaluate health care spending and quality of care at disaggregated level. 
Managed care plans at risk for enrollee’s total costs have incentives to customize health 
benefits to avoid enrolling sicker therefore high-cost patients or to provide fewer services 
to these patients to contain overall costs (Ellis, Jiang, and Kuo 2013, Ellis and McGuire 
2007). Studies have found that incentives for plans to underprovide services are strongest 
in the case of cancer, and mental health and substance abuse (McGuire et al. 2014). Thus, 
I utilize the disaggregated Florida’s Medicaid claims data of 2006-2009 to examine 
utilization and spending of mental health services. Specially, I investigate initial care 
provided to patients with newly diagnosed depression between FFS and two other 
managed care plans including the pilot ACOs. To assess the quality of provided care, I 
then compare adverse outcomes such as psychiatric hospitalization and emergency room 
(ER) use following the initial treatment across these different models.  
This chapter contributes to the existing literature in four significant ways. First, it 
brings new empirical evidence to the literature on the effectiveness of ACOs in an 
understudied population. This study, to my knowledge, is the first attempt on evaluating 
the performance of Medicaid ACOs for a disaggregated disease management.  It provides 
insights for ACOs designs in current Medicaid reforms that are underway in several 
states. Second, this study offers an alternative estimation strategy by using strong 
instruments to control for endogenous plan selections rather than commonly used 
Difference-in-Difference approach, to evaluate the performance of new delivery models. 
Third, this study extends the standard discrete choice model to incorporate heterogeneous 
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preferences to reduced form estimation, and employs the novel control function approach 
to implement the two-stage least square method in the flexible choice model. Last, this 
study sheds light on the effectiveness of managed care incentives on influencing the 
physician-level treatment choice.  
2.1.2 Summary of empirical findings 
To give a preview, the results of empirical predictions suggest that managed care 
plans, especially the ACOs, do better in access to depression care and utilization of 
lower-cost drugs than traditional FFS system. The gap in access to care remains 
statistically significant if after adjusting for individual-level characteristics and 
controlling for endogenous plan choices from both patients and providers. However, 
better access to care does not guarantee an improvement in quality of care. Because 
managed care plans are held accountable for their enrollee’s total cost, they tend to avoid 
time-consuming services or follow-up visits in order to serve more patients in a timely 
manner. In the setting of depression care, I found that managed care plans shift the office-
based psychotherapy visits toward intensive use of drug care which often involve 
polypharmacy, especially for ACOs. As a result, treatment time and patient-physician 
interaction is largely reduced and left the patients with insufficient types of treatment, 
such as individual therapy, inpatient treatment or intensive community services. 2SLS 
results suggests there are no differences in subsequent hospitalization or ER visits across 
the three models, despite the distinctive treatment of depression and unmet needs of 
treatment. This is partially due to the lack of access to local mental health care facilities 
among Medicaid patients. Overall, this study confirms the widely held finding of largely 
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unmet treatment needs for low-income patients with mental health disorders. ACOs, the 
new delivery model, provide similar depression care as pre-existing managed care plans 
in Florida Medicaid with greater access to care compared to FFS, but no improvement in 
quality of care has been evident yet. 
 The reminder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 2. 2 describes the 
institutional features of the Florida’s 2006 Medicaid Reform and reviews three delivery 
models in Florida Medicaid. Section 2.3 describes depression care and treatment 
decisions. Section 2.4 discusses the data and empirical model as well as identification 
strategy. In Section 2.5, I present the empirical results, and in Section 2.5, I discuss the 
implications and conclude. 
2.2 Institutional Background  
2.2.1 Florida’s 2006 Medicaid Reform Pilot 
This section discusses the institutional features of Florida’s 2006 Medicaid 
Reform Pilot and hypotheses that I formulate. In 2006, Florida Medicaid program 
mandated that Medicaid beneficiaries switch from the traditional Fee-For-Service (FFS) 
system to enroll with reform-approved private managed care plans including ACO-like 
plans in five pilot counties beginning from September 2006. While children, families, 
aged and disabled beneficiaries were required to enroll with a managed care plans, hereby 
referred to as the “target population”, pregnant women with incomes above 26% of the 
federal poverty level, infants between 185-200% of the federal poverty level, and 
Medicaid-Medicare dual eligible were not mandated to switch plans. The objective of the 
reform was to test the managed care mandate in pilot counties and to ultimately expand 
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the program statewide. The goals of the reform were to improve access to and quality of 
care, reduce fraud, and lower costs5.  
Reform pilot was implemented in two waves and the rollout of reform in Baker, 
Broward, Clay, Duval, and Nassau Counties is shown in Figure 2.1. The first wave began 
in September 2006 when the target populations in Broward and Duval Counties were 
required to switch from the state’s FFS system to reform-approved managed care plans. 
Most beneficiaries were counseled to switch plans within the first three months of 
implementation and all beneficiaries were required to switch plans by August 2007. If 
beneficiaries did not select a managed care plan, then the state automatically assigned 
them into a plan.6 The second wave of the reform began in September 2008 and the target 
populations in Baker, Clay, and Nassau counties switch from the FFS system to managed 
care plans. The rules and implementation were the same in both waves; however, 
beneficiaries in different counties had different plan options.  
2.2.2 Plan Types in Florida Medicaid 
Two systems existed in Florida’s Medicaid program during the time of the 
reform: the state’s FFS system and private managed care system including: primary care 
case manager (PCCM) and provider-owned plans that greatly resemble the ACOs as well 
as Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs). In order to expand Medicaid managed 
care choices, Florida implemented the Medicaid Provider Access System (MediPass) in 
                                                 
5 Florida Medicaid Reform Application for 1115 Research and Demonstration Waiver August 30, 2005: 
http: //www.fdhc.state.fl.us/medicaid/medicaid_reform/waiver/index.shtml  
6 When beneficiaries did not select a plan within their 30-day enrollment window, the state randomly 
assigned them to plans. Approximately 30% of newly enrolled beneficiaries were randomly assigned to 
plans in the first wave of reform.  
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1990 and expanded statewide in 1996. MediPass is a statewide primary care case 
management program (PCCM) and it is a non-risk form of managed care. Under 
MediPass, primary care physicians (PCPs) provide care coordination services and disease 
management services to MediPass enrollees in return for a monthly management fee per 
enrollee, plus Medicaid reimbursement for services that are rendered on a fee-for-service 
basis. During the studied period, more than 95% of studied cohorts in PCCM are enrolled 
in a behavioral health care “carve-out” plan in which a specialty behavioral health 
managed care organization provides or arranges for a specified range of mental health 
services, including community mental health, targeted case management, and psychiatric 
inpatient services. The managed care organization is pre-paid by AHCA a fixed monthly 
fee per enrollee rate based on prior utilization and is at risk for mental health service 
utilization under coverage (Shern et al. 2006). Notice that comprehensive managed care 
plans like HMOs are excluded from this analysis due to lack access to their complete 
service utilization records in Florida’s Medicaid claims data. 
One major innovation of Florida’s reform is its introduction of the provider-
owned managed care plan, an innovative insurance plan that resembles ACOs in many 
ways. These provider-owned plans, owned either by physician groups or hospitals, are 
networks of providers that directly provided care for their enrollees. Unlike Medicare 
ACOs, these pilot ACO-like plans are not yet accountable for the total cost of care and 
payments are not tied to quality performance. Florida Medicaid reimbursed the provider 
plans on the same fee-for-service schedule as the PCCM providers, but the provider plans 
are partially at-risk for their enrollees’ healthcare costs. If a provider plan’s total 
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healthcare costs are less than the total capitations set by the state, then the plan keeps the 
difference between its total healthcare costs and the total capitated reimbursement. If the 
plan’s total healthcare costs exceed the total capitation, then the plan has to return the 
difference between its total costs and the total capitation with a maximum penalty equal 
to 50% of its administrative fee (Paul Duncan et al. 2008).7 In this way, the provider 
plans receive the same benefits as insurers if they achieve cost-savings relative to FFS, 
but their losses are minimized if they did not. Like HMOs, these provider-owned 
insurance plans create networks of healthcare providers to treat patients and negotiate 
prices with healthcare providers. Given that these provider-owned plans share the feature 
of cost-saving and integrated care as ACOs, I will refer them as ACOs for simplicity for 
the remaining chapter. 
2.2.3 Linking Incentives of Delivery Models to Treatment Choice 
The FFS system, the PCCM and the ACOs (the reform plans) differed in several 
key aspects, such as reimbursement structures, risk-sharing features, cost-containment 
incentives, and provision of care, summarized in Table 2.1. First, in contrast to the FFS 
system, reform-approved managed care plans bear partial or full risk of their enrollees’ 
medical costs. Specially, the behavioral health care “carve-out” plans in PCCM are at full 
risk for mental health services thus has the strongest incentive to control costs for mental 
health care services. While ACOs received FFS reimbursement, they were at risk of 
losing up to 50% of its administrative fees from the state, making them partially at-risk of 
                                                 
7 Florida Medicaid evaluates provider plans every six months. The administrative fee is a fraction of the 
capitation fee and the state loans that amount to the provider plans at the start of each evaluation period.  
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the health cost of their enrollees. Because managed care plans were exposed to greater 
downside risk, they have incentives to employ different strategies to reduce their 
healthcare costs relative to the FFS system. These plans could vary the quantity and 
scope of (some) medical benefits, or applies utilization review for medical care to deny 
reimbursement for unnecessary medical tests and procedures. Managed care can design a 
narrow network of providers to discourage the use of out-of-network providers, and 
impose productivity target on in-network physicians in order to manage the total enrolled 
population. A result of productivity management however is reduction in repeated 
patient-physician interactions in office-based care and increase use of drug care for 
disease management.  
Vertically integrated plans like ACOs are at best position to transmit incentives to 
providers. With stronger cost control incentives and better alignment with providers, 
managed care plans can exert greater influence on physician’s treatment decisions. In this 
chapter, I focus on insurer’s impact on access to and choice of depression care for 
patients with mental illness. Because physicians were reimbursed by FFS under all three 
types of plans aforementioned and patients facing zero cost-sharing, the only cost-
containment incentives left for insurers to use is through forms of managed care, such as 
step therapy, utilization review etc.   
Specifically, I hypothesize that with stronger supply incentives, managed care 
plans are more likely to discourage repeated physician0patient inactions and shift care 
from office-based visits to drug care. In the absence of consumer cost-sharing, patients 
from PCCM and ACOs plans are more likely to receive lower cost antidepressant 
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prescriptions than FFS counterparts, as insurers tend to manage drug utilization for the 
purpose of cost containment. I also hypothesize that differential care management under 
these three models may translate into differences in occurrence of adverse health 
outcomes such as psychiatric hospitalization and emergence room use. Whether the 
Medicaid pilot ACOs would outperform the established PCCM plans in increasing access 
to care and utilizing cost-effective treatment is an important yet unanswered empirical 
question.  
2.3 Depression Care 
In the U.S., 1 in every 5 adults suffers from a mental health disorder (Health and 
Services 2002) and depression is one of the most prevalent mental health diagnoses. 
Around 6.6% of patients older than 18 years (15.7 million people) presented with at least 
one major depressive episode in the past year (SAMHSA, 2014).  Depression occurs at 
all ages, is more frequent and tends to be more severe in patients between 18 and 50 years 
old (SAMHSA, 2014) and approximately 55% of patients do not receive appropriate 
mental health treatment. Ongoing efforts to improve mental health management have led 
to expansion of mental health services access, including through the expansion of 
Medicaid in some states (Dey et al. 2016).  Importantly, Medicaid enrollees have up to 
twice higher rates of depression than uninsured or privately insured patients, and 
depression is the most common mental health disorder among Medicaid recipients 
(Adelmann 2003).  Overall, about 14 percent of Medicaid beneficiaries used a 
psychotropic medication during calendar year 2011.  In 2011, Medicaid spent about $8 
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billion in fee for service for psychotropic medications—30 percent of the program’s total 
fee-for-service drug spending (MACPAC 2015). 
Once a diagnosis of depression is established, treatment for acute depression is 
determined jointly with a patient and his or her provider, and often includes medication, 
psychosocial therapy, or both. For patients with mild to moderate depression, or those for 
whom depressive symptoms are severe, the American Psychological Association (APA) 
recommends that treatment include an antidepressant medication. If a significant level of 
psychosocial stressors accompanies the depression, and the depression itself is deemed to 
be mild to moderate, then a provider and patient may decide that psychotherapy alone is 
the most appropriate place to begin treatment (Gelenberg et al. 2010). 
 Initial selection of an antidepressant is a shared decision between a patient and a 
provider. Because the effectiveness of these medications is generally similar, the choice 
around which medication to select typically centers on trade-offs between side effects, 
other drug interactions, cost, and patient preference, etc.  By 2007, over 75% of states had 
enacted “preferred drug lists” (PDLs), which imposes different coverage and cost-sharing 
restrictions depending on whether a given drug (and/or its generic version) are on the 
preferred or non-preferred list. Often, those drugs which are non-preferred can still be 
obtained, but may require prior authorization or higher rates of cost-sharing. This is true 
of antidepressant drugs covered through state Medicaid prescription drug programs. Most 
states have a PDL for antidepressants and other mental health and substance abuse 
medication treatments, and the content of each list varies by state (and year).8 Florida was 
                                                 
8 More details are available at http://www.ncsl.org/documents/health/PDL-2-2012.pdf. 
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one of the first states to establish a Medicaid PDL, in which MCOs are required to utilize 
a uniform statewide PDL for Medicaid beneficiaries (Administration 2004). Although 
most antidepressants currently do not require prior authorization, concerns have been 
raised that by restricting access to certain types of medications, PDLs may influence 
quality of care or may influence spending for and utilization of other types of healthcare.  
Geography and physician ownership status also factored into which patients 
received antidepressants. Sole practitioners compared to non-owners were 25 percent less 
likely to prescribe antidepressants, and physicians in metropolitan areas were 27 percent 
less likely to prescribe antidepressants in all patients with depression (Lin, Erickson, and 
Balkrishnan 2011). 
 Additionally, patient preference may influence treatment choice but to a limited 
extent when patients are aware of medications either because a friend or family member 
has had success with (or has been disappointed by) a specific medication. There is also 
evidence that direct to consumer advertising (DTC) influences demand for specific types 
of antidepressant drugs (Donohue 2006).  
Prescription drugs used for the treatment of mental disorders (psychotropic drugs) 
are the principal drivers of the increase in mental health spending, accounting for 51% of 
per capita spending on mental health services (Frank et al. 2009). The antidepressant drug 
class was the most commonly used psychotropic drugs among all Medicaid beneficiaries 
as well as by adults eligible on a basis other than disability (15 percent) and children and 
adults eligible on the basis of disability (28 percent), making up one-third (33 percent) of 
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all FFS and managed care psychotropic claims and accounting for 11 percent of FFS 
spending (8 billion in calendar year of 2011) on psychotropic drugs (MACPAC 2015).  
2.4 Data and Study Samples 
The empirical analysis uses multiple types of data. The first data source is county-
level managed care enrollment reports from the Florida Agency for Healthcare 
Administration (FL AHCA). These enrollment reports reflect the enrollment in PCCM 
plans and reform approved ACO plans, as well as information on plan characteristics 
(name unique identifier, type) and insurance company on a monthly basis. The AHCA 
data show that Florida’s reform dramatically increased enrollment in ACOs.  
To compare depression treatment choices under FFS, PCCM and ACOs, I obtain 
the Medicaid Analytic Extract (MAX) claims data for Florida for the years 2005-2009. 
The MAX data are annual files extracted from the Medicaid Statistical Information 
System (MSIS), which contains individual level utilization, spending data for inpatient, 
outpatient and outpatient prescription drug services as well as patient’s demographics 
along with other enrollment-related information on all individuals enrolled in Medicaid 
program. I include Medicaid enrollees age 18-64 that were enrolled in Medicaid for the 
entire year and were newly diagnosed with depression between 2007 and 2009. I identify 
enrollees as having depression if they had at least one inpatient, or outpatient claims 
indicating depression (with an ICD-9 code of 296.2, 296.3, 296.99, or 311.xx).  Cohorts 
that dually enrolled in Medicare or a comprehensive managed care plan are excluded due 
to lack access to their complete service utilization records.  I follow the literature to 
require enrollees to have continuous enrollment for six months before their initial 
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diagnosis of depression, excluding those with an antidepressant fill in the 180 days prior 
to their index diagnosis date (Dusetzina et al. 2013). This leads to a dataset of 16382 
unique patients observed between January 1, 2007 and December 31, 2009.  
To identify the list of antidepressants, I link the MAX pharmacy claims data to 
the Truven MarketScan Red Book through National Drug Codes (NDC). Each Medicaid 
drug claim contains information on drugs prescribed at a given date, such as the quantity 
purchased, days of supply, the retail price, and the amount paid by source of payment. 
Notice that drug price under FFS arrangement in MAX reflects the state’s payment to 
pharmacies before the application of drug rebates9. Using therapeutic drug class 
identifiers from the Truven MarketScan Red Book (Reuters 2011), an industry-standard 
reference that contains details on drug (pharmaceutical) classes for prescribed medicines, 
I extract all drugs within the class of antidepressant and then aggregate them into unique 
products according to the product name, regardless of detailed packaging, dosage, source 
of manufacturers, etc. This approach allows examination of the types of antidepressant 
used, and the indications for which products are used.  
Finally, the antidepressants I am able to identify during the study period fall into 
six distinct classes according to their effect on the concentration of the chemicals 
serotonin, norepinephrine, and dopamine in the brain. Patients react idiosyncratically to 
                                                 
9 In general, a drug manufacturer must enter into a Medicaid drug rebate agreement with the U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services in order for its products to be eligible for federal funding under 
Medicaid. Drug manufacturers pay a statutorily defined rebate to Medicaid for drugs from their portfolios 
that are dispensed to Medicaid enrollees. In addition, manufacturers may negotiate supplemental rebate 
agreements with states to ensure that their products get placed on a state’s preferred drug list. These 
supplemental rebates may differ from state to state. Overall, total drug rebates were just over 50 percent of 
gross (pre-rebate) drug spending in fiscal year 2011 (MACPAC 2012b) 
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changes in the concentrations of these chemicals, creating uncertainty about the efficacy 
of any one biological mechanism for a patient (Murphy and Cowan 2009). The most 
important classes of antidepressants are the selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors 
(SSRIs), serotonin–norepinephrine reuptake inhibitors (SNRIs), tricyclic antidepressants 
(TCAs), monoamine oxidase inhibitors (MAOIs), tetracyclic antidepressants (TeCAs), 
and norepinephrine and dopamine reuptake inhibitors (NDRIs); noradrenergic and 
specific serotonergic antidepressants (NASSAs); and serotonin antagonist and reuptake 
inhibitors (SARIs) (Gartlehner et al. 2007). In my sample period, the patient and 
physician can choose among five TCAs, one TeCA, nine SSRIs, three SNRIs, two 
NDRIs, and one SARIs.  
For the purpose of static choice model, I restrict the analysis to 4558 
antidepressant prescriptions that were first filled after patient’s initial depression 
diagnosis10. The reason to focus on these first filled prescriptions is because choices of 
subsequent antidepressant prescription may largely depend on individual’s heterogeneous 
reaction to initial drug designation or to maximize patient adherence, and hence less 
likely to be influenced by insurer’s incentives for cost containment. The alternative 
treatment option, psychotherapy visits, is identified with an ICD-9 code of 908, 961, or 
977.70 from the outpatient claims data.  I also utilize the place of service indictor and 
type of service in MAX to identify and examine the effect of antidepressant use on 
avoidable hospitalization and/or emergency room visits.   
                                                 
10 For patients who received multiple antidepressants on the first fill date, often denoted as “polypharmacy” 
(Hajjar, Cafiero, and Hanlon 2007), I include all of their filled prescriptions as long as they are filled at the 
same date. Each prescription fills are treated as separate fill. There are 394 prescriptions filled as a result of 
polypharmacy.   
50 
 
Lastly, I supplement the claims data with Medicare annual enrollment report and 
Area Resources Files from 2005-2006 to draw county-level information on penetration of 
managed care plans in Medicare and health resource availability (number of active 
physicians, number of health centers and clinics, number of short-term community 
hospital beds and an indicator of rural area based on Rural-Urban Continuum Code. 
2.5 Empirical Strategies and Outcome Measures 
This section discusses the empirical challenge and strategies I employ to overcome 
this challenge when examining the following outcomes: 1) initiation of antidepressant 
medication; 2) choice of specific antidepressant and 3) subsequent psychiatric 
hospitalization and emergency room visits. 
2.5.1 Endogenous plan choice  
While patients and physicians are not randomly assigned to insurance plans in my 
setting, several features of the data provide useful exogenous variations to control for this 
endogeneity in health plan choices. First, I use the richness of the individual-level claims 
data to address concerns that patients selected into insurance plans based on the cost of 
their depression treatment. Specifically, I restrict my analysis to only those patients newly 
diagnosed with depression. New patients are unlikely to have chosen their original 
insurance plan as a function of the specific depression treatment prescribed to them at the 
time of diagnosis.  
Second, I utilize variation in county level Medicare’s managed care penetration 
rate and numbers of active medical professionals from prior years to account for 
endogenous plan choices. Managed care penetration rate from the Medicare may reflect 
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the competitiveness in the market of managed care and availability of medical 
professionals is correlated with the likelihood of forming a managed care plans. These 
supply-side features from prior years are unlikely to be correlated with demand-side 
treatment choice and therefore have the potential as valid instruments. 
To account for the endogenous plan choices, I use a 2SLS estimation in which 
plan types are instrumented by the fitted values from multinomial logit models that 
predict probabilities of selecting a given plan type in a given year. For a specific 
Medicaid beneficiary in year t,   
𝐷𝑖𝑝𝑐𝑡(𝑍𝑖𝑐𝑡) = 1𝑖𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑖 𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑠 𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑛 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 𝑝 𝑖𝑛 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑡     (1) 
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑍𝑖𝑐𝑡 =  {𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 , 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 , 𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 , 𝑀𝐴 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡, 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑃ℎ𝑦𝑠𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑐𝑡, 𝑅𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑐𝑡 ,
ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ 𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑐𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑐𝑡, 𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 − 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚  ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑏𝑒𝑑𝑠} 
As shown in equation (1), an individual i’s choice of plan p depends on patient’s 
demographic information (𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 , 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 , 𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡), county-level Medicare managed 
care penetration rate (𝑀𝐴 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡), number of active physicians (, 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑃ℎ𝑦𝑠𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑐𝑡), 
whether the county is in rural area (𝑅𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑐𝑡), number of community health centers and 
clinics (ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ 𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑐𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑐𝑡) and short-term hospital beds 
(𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡_𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚  ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑏𝑒𝑑𝑠).  
Predicted plan type choices estimated from equations (1) are then used as 
instruments for each individual in our generalized two-stage least square (2SLS) models 
of subsequent treatment choices and health outcomes. Compared to original instruments, 
using fitted values as instruments for the actual plan choice produces a more precise 
estimate with improved efficiency (Wooldridge 2010).   
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Finally, I utilize variation in provider’s patient composition to control for 
endogeneity in provider’s selection into certain plan types due to their unobserved 
characteristics. Physicians that contract with managed care plans may be those with prior 
experience with manage care, or may be more sensitive to costs and health outcomes. To 
address the endogenous plan choice by physicians, I conduct a sensitivity analysis using a 
subset of providers. Providers who treat patients from multiple types of plans face 
different incentives. Restricting to these providers, the resulting estimates across different 
plan types are thus unlikely driven by unobserved time-invariant provider characteristics. 
For this sensitivity analysis, I use state provider identification numbers to determine if 
patients received services from a particular provider during a specific encounter. 
Specially, a patient is attributed to a provider if the provider has one or more Medicaid 
claim for service use, diagnosis, or medication prescription for the patient within the 
calendar month. The final sample consists of 8516 observations at patient-provider-
month level including providers who treat newly diagnosed patients within the first-three 
months from their initial diagnoses. 
2.5.2 Initiation of Antidepressant Medication  
I first examine plan type effect on initiating antidepressant medication as initial 
treatment using cross-sectional data described in section 2.4. I use both ordinary least 
squares (OLS) and generalized 2SLS models to estimate the probability of initiating 
antidepressant medication after 90 days of initial diagnosis of depression for newly 
diagnosed patient across different types of plans. To address the difference in underlying 
health status between FFS, PCCM and ACOs, I include dummies for several morbidities 
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as control variables. Specially as shown in equation (2), whether a newly diagnosed 
patient i from plan type p initiated antidepressant at year t depends on the type of plan she 
enrolled, psychiatric disorders and comorbidities as well as demographic information at 
year t.  
𝑌𝑖𝑝𝑐𝑡 = 𝛼1𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑝 + 𝛼2𝐴𝐶𝑂𝑝 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑐 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑝𝑐𝑡 (2) 
where 𝑋𝑖𝑡 = (𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖, 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖 , 𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑖 , 𝑝𝑠𝑦𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡 , 𝑝𝑠𝑦𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑝𝑦 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡) 
, county fixed effects, 𝛾𝑐 , and a year fixed effects, 𝛿𝑡. The random error term captures 
unobserved terms. I use cluster robust errors to account for cluster correlations of errors 
within counties.  
 For robustness check, I use probit models as alternatives to estimate equation (2). 
However, because of the flexibilities in modeling terms of fix-effects, I choose to linear 
probability models as my primary approach and report results from probit models in the 
Appendix. Lastly, I re-estimate equation (2) in a restricted sample of providers described 
in section 2.5.1 as a sensitivity analysis.  
2.5.3 Choice of Antidepressant  
Next, I investigate whether the actual choice of antidepressant differs across these 
three plan types among patients who received antidepressant medication. Specially, I 
want to test whether managed care plans are more likely to prescribe cost-effective drugs 
than FFS. The empirical model I use for drug choice is an extension to Train (2009) and 
Dickstein (2011), in which a binary discrete choice is estimated by mixed logit, allowing 
unobserved heterogeneity in physician and patient preferences over drug choices.  
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To predict drug choice, I reshape cross-sectional data of 4393 patients that 
received a new prescription fill from the most common 21 antidepressants into a panel 
data. Every patient panel consists of 21 observations each corresponds to a specific drug 
listed in Table 2.3, leading to a final data of 4393*21=92253 observations at patient-drug 
level11. The dependent variable is a binary indicator, equals to 1 if the patient received a 
prescription of that particular drug and 0 otherwise. The probability of patient i from plan 
p chose drug d is estimated using the following empirical specification: 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑝𝑑 =
exp (𝛼𝐵𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑∗𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑝 + 𝛽𝐵𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑁𝑜𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑐 ∗ 𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑝 + 𝜉𝑖𝑑𝑡)
∑ 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝛼𝐵𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑∗𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑝 + 𝛽𝐵𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑁𝑜𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑐 ∗ 𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑝 + 𝜉𝑖𝑑𝑡)
21
𝑑=1
       (3) 
where 𝐵𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑 is a dummy indictor equals to 1 if the drug is brand-name and has a generic 
version available whereas 𝐵𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑁𝑜𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑐 is another dummy indicator equals to 1 if 
the drug is brand-name but has no generics. 𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑝 = (1, PCCM, ACO) which includes a 
unit constant and plan dummies one for each plan type PCCM and ACO. The unit 
constant is included to estimate the main effect of 𝐵𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑 and 𝐵𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑁𝑜𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑐. Since 
the omitted plan type is FFS, the estimated coefficients for 𝐵𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑 and  
𝐵𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑁𝑜𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑐 reflect the effects for FFS and the estimated coefficients for PCCM 
and ACO give the plan type effects as a difference from FFS. 𝜉𝑖𝑑𝑡 is the unobserved 
product characteristics and/or demand shocks (due to heterogeneous preferences) of drug 
d at time t. I use clustered robust errors to account for inter-county correlations of error 
terms. 
                                                 
11 For ease of notation, I omit additional physician index since the choice of prescription drug is a joint 
decision of both patient and physicians.  
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To implement the instrumental estimation approach in the non-linear choice 
model, I adopt a control function approach to handle the potential endogeneity of health 
plan selection. Details about the control function approach are provided in the Appendix 
B. 
2.5.4 Subsequent Psychiatric Hospitalization and Emergence Room Visits 
Finally, I assess the plan type effects on the occurrence of psychiatric 
hospitalization and ER visits among these newly diagnosed patients following their initial 
diagnoses of depression. I employ the same modeling approach as described in Section 
2.5.2 to estimate the likelihood of costly hospitalization and ER use.  
2.6 Samples and Descriptive Analysis  
To examine the pattern of treatment choice under traditional FFS, PCCM and the 
reform-approved ACOs plans, I focus on cohorts that are eligible through SSI and/or 
TANF, who are the “target” population of the 2006 Florida Medicaid Reform. Among the 
adult Medicaid beneficiaries age 18-64, 72% are eligible through SSI and/or TANF. The 
share of SSITANF is lowest in HMOs and similarly distributed in FFS, PCCM and ACO.  
With 74% of continuous enrollment in a given year, the final SSITANF sample consists 
of 606,671 enrolled beneficiaries from 2007-2009. According to the inclusion criteria 
defined in Section 4, 16382 patients with newly diagnosed of depression were identified 
from the three types of plans of my interest: FFS, PCCM and ACO.  
Table 2.2 compares descriptive statistics for these beneficiaries. Compared to 
traditional FFS patients, patients enrolled PCCM and ACOs tend to be younger adults 
and more likely from minority racial background. Notice that reform-approved ACOs 
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have disproportional high share of black patients, which is consistent with Florida 
Medicaid observation that the reform counties are more radically diverse than non-reform 
counties. Patient health status also appears to be significantly different. Overall, 30% of 
the cohorts have been newly diagnosed with major depressive disorder. Compared to FFS 
patients, those enrolled in PCCM and ACOs are less likely to meet diagnostic criteria for 
major depression but more likely to experience other depressive disorders and anxiety 
disorders. The overall health spending for those enrolled in PCCM and ACO are 
significantly higher compared to those in FFS. These unadjusted differences in health 
spending are likely associated with underlying patient health status and may also reflect 
the geographic variations in pharmacy services, care utilizations and availability of local 
health resources. 
Figure 2.2 shows the distinctive pattern of initial treatment for depression under 
the three different plan types. While major depression diagnosis is less prevalent in 
PCCM (23%) and ACO (32%) compared to FFS (33%), more than half of the cohorts in 
PCCM and ACOs received antidepressant medications and/or psychotherapy whereas 
only 27% of FFS patients received any treatment. Antidepressants are used most widely 
as initial treatment in PCCM as 57% of newly diagnosed patients received antidepressant 
within the 90 days after the initial diagnosis, followed by ACOs (46%) and FFS (6%). 
While psychotherapy is solely used as an alternative to antidepressant treatment in FFS, it 
is used as an augmentation to antidepressant medication in PCCM and ACOs. This 
distinctive pattern of initial treatment may partially due to the differences in depression 
symptoms which might not be fully captured in the current ICD-9 diagnosis, number of 
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co-occurring psychiatric/physical disorders or unobserved heterogeneous characteristics 
among prescribing providers across these plans (e.g., psychiatrist vs. primary care 
providers, or providers in managed care plans are forward looking tend to use 
medications to prevent costly hospitalizations and ER visits). These unobserved patient 
and provider characteristics once gain highlights the potential of endogenous selection to 
health plans and the importance to test and account for such endogeneity. 
Next, I summarize the set of antidepressant medications that physicians chose 
during the studied period. Market shares and average costs to insurers for the most 
common medications are presented in Table 2.3, where the list of products are 
hierarchically ordered by the subclass of antidepressants and by contained chemicals that 
effectively relief the depressive symptoms. Cost of each drug is calculated based on 30-
day supply and the cost of a product is averaged across drugs of the same chemical 
compound. Finally, drug costs are inflation adjusted to 2009’s dollars.  
As shown in Table 2.3, insurer’s drug costs vary by drug and by plan types. The 
average cost for generic treatments is fairly similar across all three plans while cost 
variations are larger for the branded drugs. Whenever single or multi-source generic 
option is available, utilization of their branded version is extremely low. Figure 2.3 
presents a graphical illustration of drug distribution using the observed market shares. 
Among the new prescription fills, over half are generic antidepressants. The share of 
generics is 7 percent higher in ACOs relative to PCCM and FFS. FFS patients are more 
likely to have new prescription fills of brand-name drugs than their counterparts in 
PCCM and ACO when no generic version is available (28.1%, 25.4% and 21.5%, 
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respectively). Market shares are lowest for brand-name drugs when the generic option is 
available, and are similar for FFS (13.0%) and ACO (12.5%) but slightly higher for 
PCCM (15.5%).  
2.7 Results 
2.7.2 Health plan choices and first stage regression results 
Table 2.5-A represents the results of the first stage regressions from the 2SLS 
models of plan effects on medication use and subsequent health care utilization. In these 
2SLS models, the predicted health plan type probabilities calculated from the plan choice 
model are used as instruments for the actual plan type choices. F-tests on the first stage 
regressions of actual plan type choices on these fitted values show that predicted 
probabilities are strong instruments.  
2.7.3 Plan Type Effects on Initiation of Antidepressant  
Table 2.4 shows both OLS and 2SLS regression results from linear probability 
models of probabilities of starting antidepressant medication as initial treatment for 
depression. Using the full sample, panel A shows that PCCM and ACO plans are 
significantly more likely to use antidepressant relative to FFS (55.7 and 43.7 percent 
higher in probabilities), even after controlling for patient demographics, underlying 
psychiatric disorders and any invariant county-level fixed effects. 2SLS and OLS results 
remain similar but the estimated effect is less significant in 2SLS due to the increased 
variations in estimated coefficients. After restricting to providers who treat patients from 
multiple plan types, the 2SLS in panel B shows even larger effects for PCCM and ACO. 
The enlarged effect suggests that when facing differential incentives, those physicians 
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that treat patients from multiple plan types were substituting away office visits towards 
drug care for managed care patients while offering office-based care to FFS patients. Not 
only do physicians favor medications over office visits, they tend to prescribe multiple 
antidepressants to managed care patients. 22.5 percent of initial medication treatment in 
ACOs involves polypharmacy relative to 16.9 percent in PCCM and 13.8 percent in FFS.  
2.7.4 Plan Type Effects on Choice of Antidepressant 
Results of flexible discrete choice models are presented in Table 2.5. Controlling 
for heterogeneous drug effects by class, I find physicians reduce the use of brand-name 
drug if a generic version available for that drug. At marginal significance level, 
physicians seeing patients in ACOs are less likely to use these brand-name drugs 
compared to physicians in FFS and PCCM. Results are consistent after further allowing 
heterogeneous preferences by patient and physician in the mixed logit model. After 
controlling for endogenous plan choices, last column shows that ACO patients were 
significantly less likely to receive drug-name drugs whereas patients from PCCM tend to 
receive more brand-name drugs relative to their counterparts in FFS. 
2.7.5 Plan Type Effects on Subsequent Psychiatric Hospitalization and ER Visits 
Finally, I estimate the probabilities of utilizing psychiatric hospitalization and ER 
visits in the 180 days following the initial diagnosis of depression. Table 2.6 presents the 
results from linear probability models. OLS results suggest that newly diagnosed patients 
from PCCM had significant lower rates in later psychiatric hospitalization while patients 
from ACOs had higher chance of using ER visits. While having certain psychiatric 
disorders are more likely to result in hospitalization and ER visits, initial treatment for 
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depression, either antidepressant medication or therapy visits rarely have an impact in 
preventing these costly services (the marginal effects are close to zero). In the 2SLS 
results, none of the plan types show statistically significant effects on reducing utilization 
of costly inpatient or ER services.  
2.8 Conclusion and Discussion  
This chapter examines variation in depression care utilization and health 
outcomes under three delivery models in the Florida Medicaid program. My results show 
that access to depression care is extremely poor for low income FFS patients. Almost 75 
percent of FFS patients with newly diagnosed depression are left untreated. By providing 
antidepressant medication treatment to over half of their newly diagnosed patients, 
managed care plans seem to achieve better access to care. The gap in access to care 
between FFS and managed care plans stems from the fact that reimbursement of mental 
health services is particularly low in Medicaid, thus creating a shortage of mental health 
care providers under FFS systems. Managed care plans, on the other hand, are able to 
attract specialists with secured patient population and profitability potentials. Notice that 
ACOs owned by either primary care physician groups or hospital are attractive to 
patients, as patients often follow their physician once the physicians form the network. 
However, better access to care does not guarantee an improvement in quality of 
care. Because managed care plans are held accountable for their enrollee’s total cost, they 
tend to avoid time-consuming services or follow-up visits in order to serve more patients 
in a timely manner. In the setting of depression care, this means managed care plans shift 
the office-based psychotherapy visits toward drug care. As a result, treatment time and 
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patient-physician interaction is further reduced. ACOs are more likely to provide generic 
antidepressant medication patients and are more likely to adopt polypharmacy to manage 
patients. 
Insufficient treatment (individual therapy, inpatient treatment or intensive 
community services) can result in worse health outcomes for those with serious mental 
illness. My results also suggest no differential pattern in subsequent hospitalization or ER 
visits across the three models, despite the unmet treatment needs. This is partially due to 
the lack of access to local mental health care facilities for Medicaid patients. Overall, this 
chapter confirms the widely held finding of largely unmet treatment needs for low-
income patients with mental health disorders. ACOs, the new delivery model, provide 
similar depression care as pre-existing managed care plans in Florida Medicaid with 
greater access to care compared to FFS, but no improvement in quality of care has been 
evident yet. 
This study is subject to several limitations. The first limitation is due to early 
stage evaluations of ACOs given that these new plans have only been rollout for three-
years in the pilot counties. These findings of ACOs may not be generalizable to Medicaid 
population in other states because each state is facing different challenges and 
constraints.  Another limitation is that I do not directly observe benefit designs, size and 
composition of provider network. Hence, I am not able to investigate whether the existing 
treatment pattern is either driven by short supply of physicians overall or it is driven by 
differences in available type of mental health care providers between FFS and managed 
care.  
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Figure 2.1: Florida Medicaid Reform Counties 
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Figure 2.2 Initial Treatment Choices for Depression under Different Plan Types 
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Figure 2.3 Market Shares of Newly Filled Antidepressant Prescriptions 
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Table 2.1: Payment, Risk Sharing and Cost Control Incentives by Plan Type 
Characteristics   FFS PCCM ACO 
Payment to plan FFS Capitation FFS 
Risk to plan No Full risk of MH 
services,  
no risk in prescription 
Partial risk 
Cost control incentive Minimal Strong Medium 
Insurer-provider integration  No Medium High 
Payment to provider FFS FFS FFS 
Gate keeper No Yes Yes 
Demand side cost sharing No No No 
Year offered 2005-2009 2005-2009 2007-2009 
Number of plans in 2007 1 9 7 
Number of plans in 2008 1 12 11 
Number of plans in 2009 1 11 10 
Notes: FFS=Fee-For-Service; PCCM= Primary Care Case Management Program; 
ACO=Accountable Care Organization. Plan information is from enrollment information of MAX 
claims data 2005-2009. 
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Table 2.2 Summary Statistics for Medicaid Beneficiaries with Newly Diagnosed 
Depression 
   Total FFS PCCM ACO   
 
% or 
mean 
% or 
mean 
% or 
mean 
% or 
mean Sig 
Demographics       
Age Group      
  18-25 5% 3% 9% 9% 0.000 
  26-44 25% 25% 26% 25%  
  45-64 70% 73% 66% 66%  
Gender      
  Male 38% 40% 34% 37% 0.000 
  Female 62% 60% 66% 63%  
Race      
  White 55% 59% 49% 39% 0.000 
  Black 20% 19% 18% 38%  
  Latino 17% 15% 21% 9%  
  Asian 0% 0% 1% 1%  
  Other 9% 6% 12% 12%  
Morbidities      
Major Depressive Disorder 30% 33% 23% 32% 0.000 
Other Depressive Disorder 71% 67% 78% 70% 0.000 
Anxiety Disorder 14% 11% 18% 15% 0.000 
Bipolar Disorder 13% 13% 12% 19% 0.000 
Utilization and Health Spending      
Fee-for-service claim count 117 72 194 191 0.000 
Medicaid Payment Amount      
Total  $17,889  $16,045  $20,999  $21,727  0.000 
Fee-for-service $17,307  $15,959  $19,494  $21,006  0.000 
Premium Payment  $582  $86  $1,505  $721  0.000 
Number of patients  16382 10363 5490 529   
Notes: With 74% continuous enrollment in a given year, the final SSITANF sample consists of 
606,671 enrolled beneficiaries from 2007-2009 who are subject to Florida’s Medicaid Reform 
programs. Patients are identified as having depression if they had at least one inpatient, or outpatient 
claims indicating depression (with an ICD-9 code of 296.2, 296.3, 296.99, or 311).  Cohorts that dually 
enrolled in Medicare or a comprehensive managed care plan are excluded due to lack access to their 
complete service utilization records. Enrollees are required to have continuous enrollment for six 
months before their initial diagnosis of depression, excluding those with an antidepressant fill in the 
180 days prior to their index diagnosis date.   
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Table 2.3 Drug Cost Per 30 Day Supply and Share of Drug Treatment  
Product Subclass Chemical Branded Insurer’s Drug Cost  Drug Share (%) 
    FFS PCCM ACO FFS PCCM ACO 
Celexa SSRI 1 Yes 12 13 12 0.0 0.1 0.0 
Citalopram SSRI 1 No 17 12 11 11.1 9.2 11.3 
Lexapro SSRI 2 Yes 108 88 98 22.5 21.2 16.4 
Prozac SSRI 3 Yes 57 57 71 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Fluoxetine SSRI 3 No 22 21 19 7.4 9.7 11.6 
Paxil SSRI 4 Yes 101 112 106 0.9 1.4 0.0 
Pexeva SSRI 4 Yes 122 134 143 1.0 2.2 0.7 
Paroxetine SSRI 4 No 35 32 32 4.1 5.8 6.1 
Zoloft SSRI 5 Yes 73 81 63 0.6 0.5 0.3 
Sertraline SSRI 5 No 22 20 18 13.5 13.1 14.0 
Cymbalta SNRI 6 Yes 161 151 154 2.4 1.5 1.0 
Effexor SNRI 7 Yes 116 131 133 5.6 5.1 2.7 
Venlafaxine SNRI 7 No 95 100 88 1.4 0.8 1.0 
Wellbutrin NDRI 8 Yes 107 142 152 2.4 4.7 6.8 
Bupropion NDRI 8 No 41 50 49 1.0 1.3 1.7 
Trazodone SARI 9 No 12 11 13 9.1 9.8 9.6 
Mirtazapine TeCA 10 No 24 25 22 11.8 5.0 5.5 
Amitriptyline TCA 11 No 10 9 8 1.9 5.0 5.5 
Clomipramine TCA 12 No 21 23 20 0.0 0.1 0.7 
Desipramine TCA 13 No 15 22 27 0.0 0.1 0.3 
Imipramine TCA 14 No 62 74 85 0.3 0.3 0.0 
Nortriptyline TCA 15 No 9 9 8 0.6 0.8 1.4 
Market Share             97.7 97.4 96.6 
Notes: 4,558 new prescription fills were identified and linked to MarketScan Red book through NDC. 
Percentages are calculated based on the new prescription fills. Prescription fills that result from 
polypharmacy are treated as separate fills and make up 16.7 percent of total prescription fills. 
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Table 2.4 Effects of Health Plan on Initiating Antidepressant Medication  
  
Panel A: All Patients with 
Newly Diagnosed 
Depression   
Panel B: Patients from Providers 
who Treated Patients from 
Multiple Plan Types 
Dependent Mean 0.26  0.45  
  OLS   2SLS   OLS   2SLS   
 Coef  Coef  Coef  Coef  
 
(Std. 
Err.)  
(Std. 
Err.)  
(Std. 
Err.)  
(Std. 
Err.)  
PCCM 0.515 
**
* 0.557 ** 0.533 
**
* 0.633 
**
* 
 (0.012)  (0.206)  (0.019)  (0.140)  
ACO 0.437 
**
* 0.489 * 0.467 
**
* 0.879 ** 
 (0.034)  (0.218)  (0.048)  (0.318)  
Age 0.001 * 0.001  0.001  0.001  
 (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  
Female 0.022  0.018  0.031 * 0.025 * 
 (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.013)  (0.012)  
Race (ref=White)         
Black -0.009  -0.009  -0.035 ** -0.032 * 
 (0.007)  (0.011)  (0.012)  (0.015)  
Latino 0.023 ** 0.018  0.024  0.014  
 (0.008)  (0.030)  (0.026)  (0.017)  
Other 0.031 ** 0.022  0.112 
**
* 0.065  
 (0.010)  (0.038)  (0.013)  (0.052)  
Major Depressive Disorder 0.027 
**
* 0.030 * 0.019  0.025  
 (0.007)  (0.015)  (0.017)  (0.014)  
Anxiety Disorder 0.041 
**
* 0.036  0.052 ** 0.039  
 (0.007)  (0.030)  (0.019)  (0.021)  
Bipolar Disorder 0.027 
**
* 0.027 ** 0.031 * 0.026  
 (0.007)  (0.010)  (0.015)  (0.015)  
Treated with Psychotherapies 
within 90 Days -0.045 
**
* -0.033  
-
0.095**
* 
**
* -0.035  
 (0.008)  (0.049)  (0.020)  (0.049)  
N 16382   16080   8516   8335   
Notes:  Columns (1) and (2) show the results from linear probability regressions at individual level. 
Results show the effects of health plan on probability of receiving antidepressant medication within 
90 days of initial depression diagnosis. Sample includes all continuous enrolled Medicaid 
beneficiaries with newly diagnosed depression in 2007-2009. Columns (3) and (4) show the results 
from regressions at patient-provider level. Sample includes providers that provided services or 
prescribed medications diagnosis to patient from the previous sample and treated patients from at 
least two different health plans. All regressions control for county and year fixed effects.  Standard 
errors are clustered at the county level. * = p<0.05, ** = p<0.01, *** = p<0.001. 
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Table 2.5 Effects of Health Plans on Indexed Antidepressant Prescription Fills 
Among Newly Treated Patients 
  
Conditional 
Logit   
Mix 
Logit   
Mix 
Logit IV   
Random Coefficient  
for Therapeutic Class     Y  Y   
Branded with Generics -1.539 *** -1.54 *** -2.000 *** 
 (0.188)  (0.189)  (0.251)  
PCCM x Branded with Generics 0.170  0.171  0.856 + 
 (0.236)  (0.236)  (0.478)  
ACO x Branded with Generics -1.035 + -1.034 + -0.534 + 
 (0.534)  (0.535)  (0.379)  
Branded with No Generics -0.029  -0.030  -0.265 + 
 (0.101)  (0.101)  (0.157)  
PCCM x Branded with No Generics 0.037  0.038  0.445 + 
 (0.148)  (0.148)  (0.247)  
ACO x Branded with No Generics -0.268  -0.268  -0.529 * 
 (0.188)  (0.187)  (0.267)  
NDRI -1.078 *** -1.078 *** -1.08 *** 
 (0.046)  (0.046)  (0.051)  
SARI 0.139 * 0.139*  0.177 *** 
 (0.057)  (0.057)  (0.053)  
SNRI -0.931 *** -1.067 *** -1.015 *** 
 (0.089)  (0.279)  (0.146)  
TCA -1.992 *** -1.994 *** -1.975 *** 
 (0.093)  (0.095)  (0.078)  
TeCA -0.312 *** -0.325 *** -0.269 *** 
 (0.064)  (0.068)  (0.071)  
N 92253   92253   89586   
Notes: Sample includes all panel data observations on first-fill prescriptions of the 4304 patients 
who received antidepressant treatment within 90 days of their initial depression diagnosis for 
years2007-2009. Panel for each patient- provider cell consist 21 observations corresponding to 21 
most common antidepressant drugs listed in Table 2.3. All regressions control for fixed effects of 
therapeutic class. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. + = p<0.10, * = p<0.05, ** = 
p<0.01, *** = p<0.001. 
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Table 2.6 Psychiatric Hospitalization and Emergency Department Use Within 180 
Days After Initial Diagnosis of Depression 
 Psychiatric Hospitalization   Emergency Room Visits 
Dependent Mean 0.05   0.09  
  OLS   2SLS     OLS   2SLS   
 Coef  Coef   Coef  Coef  
 
(Std. 
Err.)  
(Std. 
Err.)   
(Std. 
Err.)  
(Std. 
Err.)  
PCCM -0.022 
**
* -0.114   -0.000  -0.071  
 (0.003)  (0.179)   (0.005)  (0.243)  
ACO -0.000  0.025   0.022 
**
* -0.018  
 (0.011)  (0.167)   (0.006)  (0.226)  
Treated with 
Antidepressants within 
90 Days 0.008 * 0.055   0.007  0.045  
 (0.004)  (0.100)   (0.005)  (0.135)  
Treated with 
Psychotherapies within 
90 Days -0.009 * -0.021   -0.006  -0.017  
 (0.004)  (0.028)   (0.007)  (0.038)  
Age -0.000  -0.000   0.000  -0.000  
 (0.000)  (0.001)   (0.000)  (0.001)  
Female -0.001  0.000   0.004  0.005  
 (0.003)  (0.005)   (0.004)  (0.007)  
Race (ref=White)          
Black 0.008  0.009   0.007  0.009  
 (0.005)  (0.007)   (0.007)  (0.010)  
Latino -0.001  0.005   -0.001  0.005  
 (0.004)  (0.016)   (0.006)  (0.022)  
Other 0.011  0.018   0.007  0.014  
 (0.006)  (0.021)   (0.009)  (0.028)  
Major Depressive 
Disorder 0.002  -0.004   0.007  0.002  
 (0.004)  (0.011)   (0.006)  (0.015)  
Anxiety Disorder 0.018 ** 0.023   0.022 ** 0.028  
 (0.006)  (0.014)   (0.008)  (0.019)  
Bipolar Disorder 0.037 
**
* 0.034 
**
*  0.008  0.006  
 (0.006)  (0.007)   (0.007)  (0.010)  
N 16382   16080     16382   16080   
Notes: Notes:  Table shows the results from linear probability regressions at individual level. 
Results show the effects of health plan on probability of having psychiatry hospitalization or ER 
visits within 180 days of initial depression diagnosis conditioning on having no psychiatric 
hospitalization or ER visits within first 90 days. Sample includes all continuous enrolled Medicaid 
beneficiaries with newly diagnosed depression in 2007-2009. All regressions control for county and 
year fixed effects.  Standard errors are clustered at the county level. * = p<0.05, ** = p<0.01, *** = 
p<0.001. 
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2.9 Appendix A 
 
Table 2.7-A Share of Drug by Therapeutic Class Among 
First-Filled Antidepressant Prescriptions 
  Total FFS PCCM ACO 
SSRI 64% 63% 65% 63% 
SARI 10% 9% 10% 10% 
SNRI 8% 10% 7% 5% 
TeCA 6% 12% 5% 6% 
TCA 6% 3% 6% 8% 
NDRI 6% 4% 6% 9% 
Notes: Sample includes 4,558 first-filled antidepressant 
prescriptions shown in Table 2.3.  
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Table 2.8-A First Stage Results of 2SLS Models Showing the Effect of 
Health Plan on Initiating Antidepressant Medications  
  PCCM  ACO   
Panel A: All Patients  Coef  Coef  
 (Std. Err.)  (Std. Err.)  
PCCMprob 1.156 *** 0.014  
 (0.288)  (0.103)  
ACOprob -0.065 *** 1.294 *** 
 (0.331)  (0.118)  
F-statistics 12.37   85.81   
Panel B: Patients from Providers 
who Treated Patients from Multiple 
Plan Types Coef  Coef  
 (Std. Err.)  (Std. Err.)  
PCCMprob 0.620 *** -0.002  
 (0.089)  (0.040)  
ACOprob -0.092  0.979 *** 
F-statistics 24.71   23.72   
Notes: Table reports the first stage regressions of the 2SLS models showing the 
health plan effects on probability of initiating medication within 90 days of 
initial diagnosis. Regression is run for each of the two endogenous plan types 
shown as separate columns. The instruments are probabilities of choosing plan 
types (shown in rows) predicted from multinomial logit models at individual-
year level. Other exogenous control variables include penetration rate of 
Medicare Advantage (MA) plans and per capita active physicians at county 
level, patient demographics (age, gender race) as well as county-level 
characteristics in 2005 (number of active physicians, rural clinics, rural county 
indicator and hospital personnel). Sample includes all continuous enrolled 
Medicaid beneficiaries with newly diagnosed depression in 2007-2009. * = 
p<0.05, ** = p<0.01, *** = p<0.001. 
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Table 2.9-A Marginal Effects: Initiation of Antidepressant Medication 
  
Full Sample 
    
Subsample: providers treated 
patients from multiple plan 
types  
  Probit   
Probit 
IV  Probit   
Probit 
IV  
PCCM 37.9% *** 37.6% *** 43.7% *** 43.9% *** 
ACO 33.4% *** 33.4% *** 38.5% *** 39.2% ** 
Age 0.1% * 0.1% ** 0.0%  0.1%  
Female 1.6%  0.9%  2.7% * 1.8%  
Race (ref=White)         
Black 0.0%  -0.5%  -3.3% ** -3.2% * 
Latino 1.9% ** 0.8%  2.2%  2.6%  
Other 3.0% *** 1.1%  23.1% *** 23.8%  
Major Depressive Disorder 2.3% *** 2.3% *** 1.5%  2.2%  
Anxiety Disorder 3.7% *** 3.7% * 4.9% ** 5.1% * 
Bipolar Disorder 2.7% *** 2.6% *** 2.9%  2.5%  
Treated with 
Psychotherapies within 90 
Days -6.1% *** -5.9% * -10.4% *** -9.3%  
N 16382   16080   8516   8335  
Notes:  Columns (1) and (2) show the results from probit regressions at individual level. Results 
show the effects of health plan on marginal effects on probability of receiving antidepressant 
medication within 90 days of initial depression diagnosis. Sample includes all continuous enrolled 
Medicaid beneficiaries with newly diagnosed depression in 2007-2009. Columns (3) and (4) show 
the probit results from regressions at patient-provider level. Sample include providers that provided 
services or prescribed medication to patient from previous sample within 90 days of their initial 
depression diagnosis Column (1) and (3) allow random-effects at county level.  Standard errors are 
clustered at the county level. * = p<0.05, ** = p<0.01, *** = p<0.001. 
 
  
74 
 
Table 2.10-A Marginal Effects: Psychiatric Hospitalization and Emergency Room 
Visits 
  
Psychiatric 
Hospitalization   
Emergency Room 
Visits 
  Probit   Probit IV  Probit   Probit IV 
PCCM -2.2% *** -2.1%   0.3%  0.2%  
ACO 0.2%  -0.2%   1.1%  1.4%  
Treated with Antidepressants within 90 
Days 0.8% * 0.8%   0.7%  0.6%  
Treated with Psychotherapies within 90 
Days -0.7%  -0.6%   -0.8%  -0.8%  
Age 0.0%  0.0%   0.0%  0.0%  
Female -0.1%  -0.4%   0.5%  0.1%  
Race (ref=White)          
Black 0.8% + 0.8%   0.4%  0.1%  
Latino 0.1%  0.5%   -0.8%  -1.5%  
Other 1.0% + 0.6%   0.6%  -0.5%  
Major Depressive Disorder 0.3%  0.4%   0.5%  0.4%  
Anxiety Disorder 1.6% ** 1.4%   2.1%  2.2% + 
Bipolar Disorder 2.9% *** 3.2%   0.7%  0.8%  
N 16382   16080     16382   16080  
Notes:  Table shows the results from probit regressions at individual level. Results show the 
marginal effects of health plan on probability of having psychiatry hospitalization or ER visits 
within 180 days of initial depression diagnosis conditioning on having no psychiatric 
hospitalization or ER visits within first 90 days. Sample includes all continuous enrolled Medicaid 
beneficiaries with newly diagnosed depression in 2007-2009. Column (1) and (3) allow random-
effects at county level.  Standard errors are clustered at the county level. * = p<0.05, ** = p<0.01, 
*** = p<0.001. 
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Chapter 3: Do supply or demand side prices matter more in the provision of 
preventive visits? 
Jointly with Wenjia Zhu 
 
2.1 Introduction 
On March 23, 2010, the US federal government signed into law the Affordable 
Care Act (ACA), aimed at both expanding health insurance coverage among US citizens 
and controlling the country’s ever-growing health costs. Beginning Sept 23, 2010, the 
ACA mandated health insurance plans include coverage for a set of preventive health 
services to eligible people at no cost, i.e. no copayment or coinsurance, and without 
having to meet deductible requirement. Examples of covered preventive services for 
adults include recommended office visits and counseling, alcohol misuse and blood 
pressure screening, immunization vaccines and tobacco use screening. This part of the 
ACA was established based on the belief that if people use more preventive care, they 
will experience less disease and thus less costly in the long term.12 This is one potential 
mechanism through which the ACA could help control healthcare costs in the US.13 
The above rests on the assumption that people will indeed use more prevention 
when it is provided free. Whether or not such an assumption holds might not be as 
obvious as one would expect. In fact, previous studies have provided mixed evidence on 
                                                 
12 Kenkel (2000): “Prevention is often mentioned as a system-wide cost-containment strategy. For example, 
when proposing U.S. national health care reform President Clinton argued that ‘it’s just common sense ... 
[that] long-term costs to the health system will be lower if we have comprehensive preventive services’.”  
13 “Preventing illnesses before they become serious and more costly to treat helps Americans of all ages 
stay healthier,” said Kathleen Sebelius, Secretary of US Department of Health and Human Services, in a 
recent news release. For a complete report of the news release, please refer to the following link 
http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2013pres/03/20130318a.html.  
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how price changes affect the demand for preventive care.14 On the one hand, Meier 
(2000) demonstrates using a general optimal control framework that the demand for 
prevention is negatively correlated with the price of preventive services . A recent 
experiment in Oregon that provides Medicaid coverage for randomly selected low-
income adults suggests that Medicaid coverage expansion increases the use of certain 
preventive services, including mammography in women over 50 years old (Baicker et al. 
2013).15 On the other hand, Carrieri and Bilger (2013)find that Pap test and 
mammography utilization in Italy are underused even when they are provided for free. 
This phenomenon of underuse of preventive care is reconfirmed by a recent study of 
high-deductible health plans (HDHPs) (Reed et al. 2012), which additionally shows that 
84% of the enrollees know that their plans include a deductible, but around 50% 
mistakenly believe that their deductibles apply to both preventive and non-preventive 
services. This might partially explain why HDHP enrollees are not making full use of 
free-of-charge preventive care. 
The goal of this chapter is to investigate the effect of free provision of preventive 
care under the ACA on the utilization of preventive services. In particular, we examine 
the response of prevention utilization to the policy change through the lens of the 
                                                 
14 Among the various determinants of demand for preventive care that previous studies have documented, 
health insurance especially its coverage (Kenkel 1994, Jenkins et al. 1996), price of preventive services 
(Cook and Graham 1977, Meier 2000), and consumer’s preference and perception (Chapman and Coups 
1999, Lairson, Chan, and Newmark 2005, Carrieri and Bilger 2013, Carman and Kooreman 2014) are the 
most commonly recognized factors. 
15 On the other hand, Medicaid coverage is associated with a 5.74% decrease in use of flu shots over past 
12 months among persons over 50 years old, although the effect is not statistically significant. 
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employer-based health insurance which covers almost half of the US population.16 We 
are particularly interested in whether health plan types featuring different cost sharing 
structures and network arrangements will have different effects on changes in the pattern 
of prevention utilization. 
Six health plan types are of primary interest in this chapter. They are preferred 
provider organizations (PPOs), health maintenance organizations (HMOs), point-of-
service (POS) plans, Comprehensive plans (COMPs), consumer-driven health plans 
(CDHPs), and high-deductible health plans (HDHPs) that are growing in prevalence in 
recent years.17 Definitions of these plan types are adopted from the MarketScan Database 
documentation and summarized in Appendix B.18 Of particular interest are the 
differential tools used by these plan types for managing care: HMO, POS, and PPO plan 
types tend to manage care by restricting consumer choice of providers and services. In 
contrast, plan types such as CDHPs and HDHPs increase cost sharing on the consumer 
side while also allowing for greater consumer choice. Our hypothesis is that a price 
reduction in preventive care will have different impacts on health care utilization for 
consumers depending on their insurance coverage generosity and cost sharing structure. 
On the one hand, consumers in more restrictive health plans may use more preventive 
care  than before the reform in order to avoid incurring high medical needs in the event of 
                                                 
16 According to a study by the Kaiser Family Foundation, nearly 50 percent of the US population were 
covered by employer-based health insurance in 2012. More information can be accessed from here: 
http://kff.org/other/state-indicator/total-population/.  
17 In our analysis sample, PPO, HMO, and POS health plans jointly constitute 85-95 percent of the total 
enrollment during 2007-2011, while enrollment share of CDHP and HDHP plans grew from 2 percent to 9 
percent during the same period. 
18 A complete summary of basic features of distinct plan types can be found at the MarketScan Commercial 
Claims and Encounters Database 2011 User Guide. 
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an illness.19 Therefore, the free provision of care may have less of an effect on prevention 
utilization in these plans than that in those relatively more generous plans. On the other 
hand, the policy of providing free preventive care without consumers having to meet 
deductibles may induce consumers in plans featuring high deductibles to utilize more 
care than those in plans with lower deductibles. Using information on utilization of 
different plans, we apply the Difference-in-Differences method to estimate the health 
plan effects on the utilization of free-provided preventive services. 
Our analysis focuses on four specific preventive care services including flu shots, 
mammogram screenings, and office visits for preventive care by new patients and by 
existing patients.20 All of these services have been proved to be either cost-effective or 
even cost-saving, and therefore are of great interest to the ACA reform in cost 
containment through earlier prevention (Maciosek et al. 2006). Furthermore, 
measurements of these preventive services are constructed using the procedure code in 
the MarketScan outpatient claims data following the guideline of Current Procedural 
Terminology (CPT) coding scheme for preventive services issued by American Medical 
                                                 
19 Plans like HMOs manage care also by paying services on a capitated basis, thus directing incentives on 
the part of providers towards quality of care (including prevention) than quantity of care. 
20 According to Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), a new patient is one “who has not 
received any professional services, i.e., E/M service or other face-to-face service (e.g., surgical procedure) 
from the physician or physician group practice (same physician specialty) within the previous 3 years.” For 
more information see “Questions and Answers on Reporting Physician Consultation Services”, January 
2010, Medicare Learning Network Matters® at http://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-
Guidance/Guidance/Transmittals/2010-Transmittals-
Items/CMS1233364.html?DLPage=1&DLFilter=Questions%20and%20Answers%20on%20Reporting%20
Physician%20Consultation%20Services&DLSort=1&DLSortDir=descending.  
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Association.21 Given our focus on primary care, we only include preventive services that 
do not involve diagnoses or secondary treatment. 
We utilize rich risk adjustment tools that predict patients’ expected spending 
(concurrently and prospectively) to distinguish consumer underlying health status from 
consumer preference in identifying the utilization patterns. Since both the consumer and 
the provider determine health care use jointly and we only observe the outcome of this 
joint decision processes, we do not attempt to model consumer and provider decisions 
separately in this chapter.  
We use the 2007-2011 Truven MarketScan Claims and Encounter Data to 
examine the pattern of preventive care utilization across time and across health plans. To 
our knowledge, the MarketScan commercial data has not been used to directly look at 
this issue, and we believe that the large sample size obtained from the MarketScan data 
has the advantage in estimation power and accuracy.  
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, we briefly describe 
the structure of the MarketScan data set and the construction of variables. Section 3.3 
provides descriptive analysis on the pattern of changes in price and utilization rate of the 
four preventive services before and after the policy. In Section 3.4, we employ the 
Difference-In-Differences approach to estimate the effect of the ACA’s free provision of 
                                                 
21 The document that provides the guideline of CPT coding scheme is called “CPT code guide for 
preventive services with cost-sharing waived”. The procedure codes ‘90656’, ‘90658’, ‘90460’, ‘90471’, 
‘90472’, and ‘G0008’ correspond to flu shots; the corresponding codes for mammogram screening are 
‘77052’, ‘77057’, and ‘G0202’; office visit for preventive care by new patients is coded by ‘99385’ and 
‘99386’; office visit for preventive care by existing patients are coded by ‘99395’ and ‘99396’. More 
details are provided in Appendix B. 
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preventive care on use of preventive services. We conclude and discuss limitations and 
future work in Section 3.5. 
2.2 Data Description and Variables of Interest 
We use data from the 2007-2011 Truven MarketScan Claims and Encounter Data 
that contains rich information on outpatient claims and annual enrollment records for 
each health plan. Our sample contains 5.1 million commercially insured adults aged 21-
64 in all 50 states and District of Columbia who are continuously eligible for five full 
years during 2007-2011, resulting in over 300 million enrollee months. Other sample 
selection restrictions include non-missing age, gender, region, and having at least one 
month of plan type information in any year. Considering that plan type information can 
be missing for some enrollees in partial years (25,042 out of 307,280,520 person 
months), we impute the missing plan type using the following two-step algorithm. In the 
first step, we identify the first time (“pioneer” month) a plan type is seen for each 
enrollee over the 60-month period and impute subsequent month(s) whenever plan type is 
missing until another month’s plan type is observed. Next, if plan type is missing for any 
month(s) prior to the “pioneer” month, we impute backward using the plan type seen in 
the “pioneer” month for that enrollee. The distribution of plan types (across person 
months) looks very similar before and after the imputation. 
We utilize rich risk adjustment tools to predict and control for patient underlying 
health status from consumer taste in quantifying the utilization patterns. Specifically, we 
use Verisk Health/DxCG Risk Solutions Version 4.1.1 software to generate predictions 
for each enrollee-month using eligibility, age, sex and diagnostic information. Two types 
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of diagnosis-based risk scores are considered. The first is a concurrent risk score where 
diagnostic information from the current month is used to predict resource use and costs in 
that month. The second risk score employs a “point-in-time” prediction strategy where 
diagnostic information from the 12 months prior to the current month is used to predict 
consumer’s expected spending in that month(Ellis and Zhu 2016). For example, for 
estimating a consumer’s resource use and spending in month 1 of 2008, diagnostic 
information from month 1 of 2007 to month 12 of 2007 is used. Information from month 
2 of 2007 through month 1 of 2008 is then used to predict spending in month 2 of 2008, 
and so on. 
Our analysis sample includes COMP, PPO, HMO, POS, CDHP and HDHP plans 
that constitute almost 99% of the total plan enrollment during the 2007-2011 period and 
our sample excludes the rest of the plans.22 We aggregate individual-month level data to 
the plan type-state-month level, resulting in a final sample of 22,916 observations that 
cover the utilization of all the four preventive services.23 Finally, we define our 
dependent variable, the utilization rate per 10,000 people of a certain service in plan p in 
state s in time t, 𝑌𝑝𝑠𝑡, as follows: 
𝑌𝑝𝑠𝑡 =
# 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑎 𝑔𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛 𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑛 𝑝 𝑖𝑛 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒
# 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑛𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑎 𝑔𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛 𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑛 𝑝 𝑖𝑛 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡
×10,000         (1) 
𝑈𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑛 𝑝 =
# 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑛 𝑝 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒
# 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑛𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑛 𝑝
×10,000                     
                                                 
22 We exclude POS plans with capitation also because these plans feature capitation payments that are 
likely understated and thus unreliable for analysis of price. 
23 Note that observations with monthly enrollment less than or equal to 20 are excluded. We do this because 
many of these observations have unconventionally high rates of utilization due to its limited size, making 
utilization rate extremely sensitive to randomness. 
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2.3 Descriptive Analysis 
2.3.1 Summary statistics 
Table 3.1 provides summary statistics by health plan type at the person-month 
level. The third column shows the prevalence of plan types over the five years being 
studied here. PPOs, HMOs, and POS plans are the three most common plan types, taking 
up almost 90% of the total enrollment in our sample. While EPOs and POS plans with 
capitation are the least popular plans in our sample, CDHPs and HDHPs are gaining 
market share and together accounts for more enrollment share than the conventional 
comprehensive plans.  
Columns 4 to 7 summarize statistics of age, sex, pharmacy (RX) and mental 
health and substance abuse (MHSA) coverage. Column 8-11 lists four measures of the 
concurrent and prospective relative risk scores. Differences found in these demographic 
characteristics signal a significant difference in enrollee’s health risk across plan types. 
Comprehensive plans have an average age that is seven years older than EPOs, which 
have the youngest adult enrollees. In addition, comprehensive plans have an average ten 
percentage point fewer male enrollees than POS plans with capitation. With the exception 
of PPOs, almost everyone in the rest of the plans is covered by RX benefits. There are 
also a substantial proportion of enrollees in PPOs who do not have MHSA coverage. 
Finally, the four measures of risk scores show a consistent pattern of health risk 
difference across plan types, with comprehensive plans having the least healthy enrollees, 
and EPOs and HDHPs on average enrolling in the healthiest group of adults. 
2.3.2 Prices before and after the policy 
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There are concerns about how well the free provision requirement has been 
implemented, especially in the presence of “grandfathered” health plans that are generally 
exempt from the ACA requirements.24 In order to assess this concern, we look at the 
actual price changes in preventive care services around the ACA reform, which would 
give us a sense of the plans’ compliance with the free provision policy given that we have 
no precise information about whether or not each health plan is a “grandfathered” plan 
that can be exempt from the free provision requirement. For each of the four services, we 
track down the total out-of-pocket (OOP) payment, a sum of copayment, coinsurance and 
deductible payments, incurred by individuals for that service during the period 2007-2011 
using the MarketScan claims data. We are particularly interested in whether consumers 
experienced a reduction in their OOP payments after the ACA reform.  
Figures 3.1 to 3.4 plot the monthly average OOP payments per service by 
individuals who incurred claims on each of the aforementioned preventive services over 
time. Since a claim can contain multiple services, but most claims have just one service, 
we include only claims with a single service quantity for our analysis.25 In addition, for 
each service, we exclude claims with outlier payment amounts, namely those with 
negative per-service OOP payments and those above the top 1% of the entire distribution 
of the OOP payments. Payment is first averaged across person claims in each month. The 
monthly price is then adjusted by taking out the seasonality and thus each point on the 
                                                 
24 “Grandfathered” plans are group health plans that are either created or purchased before March 23, 2010. 
They are usually generous plans and may lose “grandfathered” status if benefits are significantly reduced or 
costs substantially increased to consumers. More information from here: 
https://www.healthcare.gov/glossary/grandfathered-health-plan/.  
25 Across the services under study, over 99.5% of all claims have just one service. 
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graph represents the sample average price plus the monthly deviation from the sample 
mean. The vertical line indicates October 2010, the first month after the ACA requires the 
free provision of designated preventive services. As can be seen from the figures, there is 
an overall downward trend in the consumer OOP payments for all of the services after 
October 2010 relative to before. This is especially true for preventive office visits by new 
and established patients, while the immediate drop in payments are relatively modest in 
mammogram screenings and flu shots.26 A more remarkable finding is that for all the 
services, the drop in consumer’s OOP payments is the most salient in January 2011. This 
observation reflects the possibility that in response to the new law, most health plans do 
not make changes to their insurance contracts until a new circle begins and most contracts 
refresh circles in January. For each service, we further aggregate the monthly payments 
into two periods, before and after the reform, to look at the change in average per-service 
OOP payments as is shown in Table 3.2.27 Figure 3.5 is a graphical replication of Table 
3.2. They both show dramatic drops in OOP payments for all four preventive services, 
with the average decrease for established office visits being over 60 percent. Although 
the average payment levels are much lower for mammogram screenings and flu shots, the 
percentage decrease in payments are significant and large in magnitude, by about 45 and 
50 percent, respectively. 
                                                 
26 The pattern of price drop preserves if we take out the deductible from the price measure and only look at 
copayment and coinsurance payment. However, price drops are generally larger when deductible is 
included, suggesting the possibility that on average less is paid towards the deductible for preventive 
services after the reform. 
27 Since the same set of people is enrolled in each month, we do not distinguish between weighted and un-
weighted mean here when conducting the aggregation. 
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Figure 3.A-2 provides further evidence that the average service prices drop after 
the policy but the figure also highlights the fact that those changes differ across plan 
types. It is noticeable that plan types like CDHPs and HDHPs have considerably lower 
prices (including copayment, coinsurance payment, and deductible) across all the services 
being studied here. There are at least three possibilities. First, relative to the other plan 
types, people in CDHPs and HDHPs choose to pay preventive office visits mostly after 
(or close to) the point when their deductibles or annual OOP maximum are met.28 
Second, plan types like CDHPs and HDHPs charge particularly low copayments and/or 
coinsurance payments to consumers, encouraging them to take more preventive care to 
avoid future medical needs. Third, it is also possible that people in different plan types 
differ in their underlying health risks and may undergo different types of services that 
result in varying OOP payment schemes. The service categories we make can be too 
broad to capture these nuanced differences in the services actually obtained by 
consumers. 
2.3.3 Utilization before and after the policy 
Having illustrated that with the establishment of free preventive care people are 
paying less out of pocket for prevention services, we now turn to the examination of 
utilization change under the policy change. Figure 3.6 to 3.9 illustrate the utilization 
pattern of each of the four preventive services during 2007 to 2011. The monthly 
utilization is adjusted by taking out the seasonality so that each point on the graph 
                                                 
28 We observe that utilization rates for established office visits in HDHPs tend to grow throughout a year 
and peak at December in each year. However, such a pattern is less seen for established office visits in 
CDHPs and new office visits in HDHPs and CDHPs, suggesting that this aspect cannot explain all the 
observed price variations in CDHPs and HDHPs. For more information, refer to Figure A-3. 
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represents the sample average utilization plus the monthly deviation from the sample 
average. Figure 3.6 shows that the utilization of new preventive office visits remains 
stable during the period and there seems no significant difference before and after the 
reform. Since our sample consists of only those who are enrolled in five full years, the 
pattern in the figure reflects the possibility that the adult enrollees in our sample rarely 
switched their primary care physicians (PCP) or PCP practice group and thus few would 
be counted as new patients.29 For mammogram screenings and preventive office visits by 
existing patients (Figure 3.7 and 3.8), there are more apparent monthly fluctuations and 
an increasing trend in utilization throughout the period. In Figure 3.9, we see spikes in 
utilization of flu shots around October in each year, and the pattern of change before and 
after the policy is not easily identified from the figure. 
For each service, we aggregate the monthly utilization rate to the plan type-state-
month level, and compare the utilization before and after the policy. Results are shown in 
Table 3.3.30 Both differences in means and in percentage change, weighted and un-
weighted, are reported. The weighted results (Panel B of Table 3.3, and replicated in 
Figure 3.10) show strong evidence that all the preventive services under study 
experienced significant increases in average utilization after the reform. When it comes to 
the percentage change, it is clear that flu shots experienced the biggest increase in 
utilization after the policy change, followed by preventive office visits by existing 
                                                 
29 According to the definition of new patient, another possibility would be that few people continue to seek 
preventive care after a gap longer than three years. 
30 We use observations at plan-state-month level to summarize variables in Table 3. In panel B, means are 
weighted by total population (for office visits and flu shots) or by the total eligible female enrollees in each 
plan type-state-month cell (for mammogram screenings). 
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patients and mammogram screenings. Again, the utilization of new preventive office 
visits does not show a large-scale change after the policy, suggesting that few enrollees in 
our sample switched PCP or PCP practice group for preventive office visits. Finally, 
comparing weighted and un-weighted results with weights being the plan type-state-
month specific enrollment, we find that the weighted measures are generally smaller in 
magnitude. This suggests that the overall utilization of preventive care is dominated by 
large plans whose service use is generally lower. 
Our monthly measures of utilization rate may underestimate the actual coverage 
of prevention. For instance, mammogram screenings are recommended to women once in 
a year or once every two years. Therefore, the shape of monthly utilization rate of 
mammogram may reflect the timing when individuals are recommended to use the 
screening, rather than how much they want to utilize the service each month. Despite 
these potential limitations, we use monthly measures because, compared to yearly 
measures, they are better at capturing within year variations in utilization pattern and thus 
allow for a more precise estimate of changes before and after the treatment. 
2.4 Empirical Strategy and Results 
2.4.1 Empirical model 
Having provided evidence on the overall changes in the prevention utilization in 
response to the price changes under the policy, we turn to the question of whether health 
plan types differing in their generosity and cost sharing structure have differential effects 
on the utilization response. We use the Difference-in-Differences approach to quantify 
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the effect of free preventive care on utilization rates of each of the four services across 
plan types. Our main estimating equation is as follows: 
𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑌𝑝𝑠𝑡) = 𝛼𝑖×𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑝 + 𝛾×𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽𝑝×(𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡×𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑝) + 𝜆×𝑋𝑝𝑠𝑡 +
∑ 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑖
12
𝑖=1 + 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 + 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 + 𝜖𝑝𝑠𝑡                                                            (2)                     
Where 𝑌𝑝𝑠𝑡 is the utilization rate (use per 10,000 enrollees) of a given service for 
plan p in state s during month t. 𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑝 is a dummy equal to 1 if the plan type is p 
and 0 otherwise. Likewise, 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 is a dummy representing whether observation is selected 
after the reform (i.e. Oct 2010 and afterwards) or not.  𝑋𝑝𝑠𝑡 contain all the control 
variables representing the characteristics for plan p in state s in month t, including RX 
and MHSA coverage, prospective and concurrent risk scores. We also control for 
seasonality (𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑖  is a month dummy equal to 1 if i=t), time trend and state fixed 
effects. For variables that are related to health plans, the reference group is PPO plans, so 
the parameters of interest 𝛽𝑝′s can be interpreted as the incremental effect of free 
provision of preventive care on utilization rate of a certain service for each plan relative 
to PPO plans. 
Since all the four measurements of utilization are highly skewed to the left, we 
log-transform the dependent variables so as to improve the overall fitting of our linear 
regression model. To enable log-transformation for observations that are equal to zero, 
we assign a positive small constant to each of these observations using the following 
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algorithm.31 For each service, utilization rates with a value of zero are transformed to the 
50% level of the minimum non-zero utilization rate for that service, making sure that (1) 
the transformed values retain the original rank; and (2) all utilization rates after log 
transformation will have positive values.  
2.4.2 Results on health plan effects on prevention utilization 
Table 3.A-1 in Appendix A reports the main results from equation (2). All 
regressions control for time trend, seasonality, plan and state fixed effects. Column (1) is 
the base model. Column (2) additionally controls for average RX benefits coverage and 
MHSA coverage in plan type p in state s in month t. Column (3) also controls for 
prospective relative risk score within each plan type-state-month cell. Column (4) adds to 
the model a monthly concurrent relative risk score. Since prospective risk scores, by 
construction, use information from 12 prior months, Column (3) and (4) only use 
observations from 2008 to 2011. Overall, Table 3.A-1 shows modest increases in 
utilization rates of preventive services. 
Given that our focus is on the (absolute and relative) health plan type effects on 
utilization response to the reform, we summarize the predicted effects on rates of 
preventive services by plan type using Table 3.4. Panel A of the table corresponds to the 
baseline model (Column (1) of Table 3.A-1), and Panel B refers to the complete model 
(Column (4) of Table 3.A-1) with additional controls on RX and MHSA coverage, 
prospective and concurrent relative risk score within each plan type‐state‐month cell. For 
                                                 
31 At the plan type-state-month level, the percentages of zero utilization are 25.8%, 10.3%, 12%, and 16.9% 
for new preventive office visits, established preventive office visits, mammogram screenings, and flu shots, 
respectively. 
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each service type, the first column shows the change in utilization rate after the reform 
(relative to before) for each plan. Then each plan type’s utilization change compared to 
that of PPO is reported in the second column. Because our dependent variable – 
utilization per 10,000 populations – is in log form, we translate our regression estimates 
into percentage terms, as shown in each cell in Table 3.4. 
Our baseline model (Panel A of Table 3.4) shows that responses to the reform 
differ by service and by plan type. Across the four services, new preventive office visits 
show the largest increase in utilization rate for all plan types except for comprehensive 
plans where use per 10,000 populations goes down by 6.57%. For established office 
visits, mammogram screenings, and flu shots, utilization change varies a lot across plans. 
One potential reason can be that some features of plan design may change over time 
resulting in shifts in risk pool composition across plan types that have nothing to do with 
consumer behavioral response. To account for this, we expand our base model with 
additional controls on RX and MHSA coverage, prospective and concurrent relative risk 
score (we call it the complete model).  
The results are shown in Panel B of Table 3.4. First, the reform increased the 
utilization rate in all the four services among PPO enrollees, although the effect is not 
significant for established office visits. For new preventive office visits and flu shots, the 
utilization rates increased in almost all plan types after the reform except for 
comprehensive plans for new office visits. It is also worth noticing that new preventive 
office visits have the largest percentage increase in utilization in HDHPs (by 13.17%) and 
the utilization response is the largest (in percentage term) in CDHPs (by 11.33%) for flu 
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shots. For established preventive office visits and mammogram screenings, utilization 
increased the most (in percentage term) among HDHPs (7.75% and 6.64%) and CDHPs 
(5.71% and 5.90%), followed by PPOs (1.55% and 2.44%). In contrast, utilization rates 
of these two services generally decrease for HMOs, POS and Comprehensive plans. 
As mentioned earlier, our hypothesis suggests that a price reduction in preventive 
care will have different impacts on health care utilization for consumers differing in their 
insurance coverage generosity and cost sharing structure. In particular, the utilization 
response should be larger in high-deductible plans like HDHPs and CDHPs compared to 
PPOs, while the policy may have less of an effect on prevention utilization in less 
generous plans such as HMOs and POS relative to PPO plans. The Difference-in-
Differences estimates in the second column from Panel B of Table 3.4 provide some 
evidence for our hypothesis. For new and established preventive office visits and 
mammogram screenings, increase in utilization is higher among HDHPs relative to PPOs 
enrollees (although the change in HDHPs for new preventive office visits is not 
significantly different than PPOs). The same pattern holds for CDHPs. Although the 
utilization of flu shots increases among CDHPs and HDHPs enrollees after the reform, 
the increase is not larger than that of PPOs.32 One reason could be that many alternatives 
exist for patients who would like to receive flu shots, for instance, at retail pharmacy 
stores or through free vaccine by community health centers, without having to worry 
about deductibles and/or availability of network providers. This may lead to a smaller 
                                                 
32 The increase is not significant for HDHP plans. 
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response to free provision of flu shots among CDHPs/HDHPs relative to PPOs, 
especially during the early years after the reform. 
On the other hand, the policy has a negative effect on utilization of all the four 
services among HMOs/POS enrollees relative to PPOs. In particular, utilization changes 
among established patients are significantly lower in HMOs/POS than in PPOs. This is 
consistent with our hypothesis that prevention has been widely used as a tool for cost 
control by HMOs/POS before the reform, and thus the policy would have less of an effect 
on HMOs/POS population than on those more generous plans like PPOs. Finally, among 
comprehensive plans, utilization rates of all the services except for flu shots go down by 
about 10% after the reform, and this further enlarges the differential effects in utilization 
response compared to PPO plans. 
2.5 Conclusion and Discussion 
Overall, we observe significant price reduction and modest increases in utilization 
rates of preventive services under the reform that requires certain preventive services be 
provided for free. In addition, price reduction in preventive care has different impacts on 
health care utilization for consumers differing in their insurance coverage generosity and 
cost sharing structure. Among the plans that are less generous compared to PPOs, the free 
provision of preventive care generally increases the use of preventive services among 
health plans featuring high deductibles such as CDHPs and HDHPs. On the other hand, 
the reform seems to have a negative effect on rates of preventive services among health 
plans with restrictive service or provider network like HMOs and POS plans. This is 
consistent with our hypothesis that (1) preventive services are more valued among high 
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deductibles plans because of the deductible waiver under free provision, and that (2) 
health plans that are restrictive in service coverage and provider network may have 
emphasized prevention as a tool for cost containment before the reform, thus resulting in 
less of an effect on utilization response relative to more generous plans. 
One of the main limitations of this chapter is that we did not account for 
individuals switching behavior between different plan types. Under the current grouped 
data analysis, results can be a combined effect of both consumers’ demand response to 
the policy change and their switching behavior that may or may not have anything to do 
with the policy. This can be overcome by applying the same analysis at the individual 
level predicting each individual’s probability of using certain services, which will shed 
light on the demand elasticity of preventive care and will be the focus of our future work. 
Another limitation of our study is the short length of after-policy data. Since the policy 
change took place in September 2010 and our current data is only up to 2011, our results 
may understate the outreach of preventive care due to (1) unawareness of or lack of 
knowledge about free preventive care, especially among plans featuring high-deductibles, 
(2) insufficient response time by consumers, and (3) the health plans’ compliance with 
the law that may play a role in the full implementation of free provision of preventive 
care. Moreover, our study did not include supply side analysis and therefore our results 
reflect a combination of the demand and supply side responses to the policy. 
Furthermore, our conclusion would be strengthened by a falsification test on services that 
are not supposed to be affected by the policy and that are not close to substitutes or 
complements to the four services being studied here (e.g. emergency room visits). 
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Finally, another extension of our chapter is to further look at the impact of the reform on 
medical spending and patient health outcomes associated with preventive services. 
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 Figure 3.1 Monthly New Preventive Office Visits Per-Service OOP Payment 2007-2011 
 
Notes: Graph shows the monthly average per service out-of-pocket (OOP) payments for new preventive 
office visits by enrollees in our sample. Sample is from the MarketScan Commercial Claims and Encounter 
Data, including enrollees who are: adults aged 21-64, continuously eligible for five full years during 2007-
2011, with non-missing age, gender, region, and have at least one month of plan type information in any 
year. Consumer’s OOP payment is the sum of copayment, coinsurance payment, and deductible. Monthly 
mean payment is gauged by averaging per-service OOP payments across person claims to the month level. 
For each service, we exclude claims with outlier payment amounts, namely those with negative per-service 
OOP payments and those on and above the top 1% of the entire OOP payments distribution. The monthly 
price is adjusted by taking out the seasonality and thus each point on the graph represents the sample 
average price plus the monthly deviation from the sample average.   
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Figure 3.2 Monthly Established Preventive Office Visits Per-service Payment 2007-2011 
 
Notes: Graph shows the monthly average per service out-of-pocket (OOP) payments for established 
preventive office visits by enrollees in our sample. Sample is from the MarketScan Commercial Claims and 
Encounter Data, including enrollees who are: adults aged 21-64, continuously eligible for five full years 
during 2007-2011, with non-missing age, gender, region, and have at least one month of plan type 
information in any year. Consumer’s OOP payment is the sum of copayment, coinsurance payment, and 
deductible. Monthly mean payment is gauged by averaging per-service OOP payments across person 
claims to the month level. For each service, we exclude claims with outlier payment amounts, namely those 
with negative per-service OOP payments and those on and above the top 1% of the entire OOP payments 
distribution. The monthly price is adjusted by taking out the seasonality and thus each point on the graph 
represents the sample average price plus the monthly deviation from the sample average.  
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Figure 3.3 Monthly Mammogram Screening Per-service OOP Payment 2007-2011 
 
Notes: Graph shows the monthly average per service out-of-pocket (OOP) payments for mammogram 
screenings by enrollees in our sample. Sample is from the MarketScan Commercial Claims and Encounter 
Data, including enrollees who are: adults aged 21-64, continuously eligible for five full years during 2007-
2011, with non-missing age, gender, region, and have at least one month of plan type information in any 
year. Consumer’s OOP payment is the sum of copayment, coinsurance payment, and deductible. Monthly 
mean payment is gauged by averaging per-service OOP payments across person claims to the month level. 
For each service, we exclude claims with outlier payment amounts, namely those with negative per-service 
OOP payments and those on and above the top 1% of the entire OOP payments distribution. The monthly 
price is adjusted by taking out the seasonality and thus each point on the graph represents the sample 
average price plus the monthly deviation from the sample average.   
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Figure 3.4 Monthly Flu Shots Per-service OOP Payment 2007-2011 
 
Notes: Graph shows the monthly average per service out-of-pocket (OOP) payments for flu shots by 
enrollees in our sample. Sample is from the MarketScan Commercial Claims and Encounter Data, 
including enrollees who are: adults aged 21-64, continuously eligible for five full years during 2007-2011, 
with non-missing age, gender, region, and have at least one month of plan type information in any year. 
Consumer’s OOP payment is the sum of copayment, coinsurance payment, and deductible. Monthly mean 
payment is gauged by averaging per-service OOP payments across person claims to the month level. For 
each service, we exclude claims with outlier payment amounts, namely those with negative per-service 
OOP payments and those on and above the top 1% of the entire OOP payments distribution. The monthly 
price is adjusted by taking out the seasonality and thus each point on the graph represents the sample 
average price plus the monthly deviation from the sample average.  
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Figure 3.5 Average Per-service OOP Payments by Service Type Before and After Oct 2010 
 
Notes: Graph shows the average per-service out-of-pocket (OOP) payments for the four preventive service 
types before and after Oct 2010. Sample is from the MarketScan Commercial Claims and Encounter Data, 
including enrollees who are: adults aged 21-64, continuously eligible for five full years during 2007-2011, 
with non-missing age, gender, region, and have at least one month of plan type information in any year. 
Consumer’s OOP payment is the sum of copayment, coinsurance payment, and deductible. For each service 
type, we first calculate the monthly mean payment by averaging per-service OOP payments across person 
claims to the month level. Then seasonality is taken out from the monthly data. We then average across 
months to compare payments before and after Oct 2010. Since the same group of people are enrolled in 
each month, we do not distinguish between weighted and un-weighted mean here. For each service type, 
we exclude claims with outlier payment amounts, namely those with negative per-service OOP payments 
and those on and above the top 1% of the entire OOP payments distribution.   
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Figure 3.6 Monthly New Preventive Office Visits 2007-2011 
 
Notes: Graph shows the utilization per 10,000 people of preventive office visits by new patients during the 
60-month period between 2007 and 2011. Sample is from the MarketScan Commercial Claims and 
Encounter Data. Included in the sample are enrollees who are: adults age 21-64, continuously eligible for 
five full years during 2007-2011, with non-missing age, gender, region, and have at least one month of plan 
type information in any year, resulting in 5.1 million enrollees and about 300 million person months. The 
monthly utilization is adjusted by taking out the seasonality and thus each point on the graph represents the 
sample average utilization plus the monthly deviation from the sample average.  
101 
 
Figure 3.7 Monthly Established Preventive Office 2007-2011 
 
Notes: Graph shows the utilization per 10,000 people of preventive office visits by established patients 
during the 60-month period between 2007 and 2011. Sample is from the MarketScan Commercial Claims 
and Encounter Data. Included in the sample are enrollees who are: adults age 21-64, continuously eligible 
for five full years during 2007-2011, with non-missing age, gender, region, and have at least one month of 
plan type information in any year, resulting in 5.1 million enrollees and about 300 million person months. 
The monthly utilization is adjusted by taking out the seasonality and thus each point on the graph represents 
the sample average utilization plus the monthly deviation from the sample average.  
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Figure 3.8 Monthly Mammogram Screening Rate 2007-2011 
 
 Notes: Graph shows the utilization per 10,000 people of mammogram screenings during the 60-month 
period between 2007 and 2011. Sample is from the MarketScan Commercial Claims and Encounter Data. 
Included in the sample are enrollees who are: adults age 21-64, continuously eligible for five full years 
during 2007-2011, with non-missing age, gender, region, and have at least one month of plan type 
information in any year, resulting in 5.1 million enrollees and about 300 million person months. The 
monthly utilization is adjusted by taking out the seasonality and thus each point on the graph represents the 
sample average utilization plus the monthly deviation from the sample average.  
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Figure 3.9 Monthly Flu Shots Utilization Rate 2007-2011 
 
Notes: Graph shows the utilization per 10,000 people of flu shots during the 60-month period between 2007 
and 2011. Sample is from the MarketScan Commercial Claims and Encounter Data. Included in the sample 
are enrollees who are: adults age 21-64, continuously eligible for five full years during 2007-2011, with 
non-missing age, gender, region, and have at least one month of plan type information in any year, resulting 
in 5.1 million enrollees and about 300 million person months. The monthly utilization is adjusted by taking 
out the seasonality and thus each point on the graph represents the sample average utilization plus the 
monthly deviation from the sample average. 
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Figure 3.10 Average Monthly Utilization Rate by Service Type Before and After Oct 2010 
 
 
Notes: Figure replicates the bottom panel of Table 3. Graph shows the average monthly utilization rate (per 
10,000) population for the four preventive service types before and after Oct 2010. Sample is from the 
MarketScan Commercial Claims and Encounter Data, including enrollees who are: adults age 21-64, 
continuously eligible for five full years during 2007-2011, with non-missing age, gender, region, and have 
at least one month of plan type information in any year. Utilization rate (per 10,000 population) is defined 
as [(# of persons in a given plan p in state s in time t receiving the service)/(# of total enrollees in a given 
plan p in state s in time t)]*10,000. For each service type, we first calculate individual's use of service at the 
month level, and then aggregate to the plan type-state-month level to calculate the utilization rate for a 
certain plan type in a certain state in a specific month, with means weighted by the total population (for 
office visits and flu shots) or the number of eligible female enrollees (for mammogram screenings) in each 
plan type-state-month cell. All health plan types are included in the sample, but plan type-state-month cells 
with fewer than 20 observations are dropped.
  
Table 3.1 Summary Statistics by Health Plan Type 
Plan type 
Acro
nym 
Person-month 
enrollment Age Male 
RX 
flag 
MHS
A 
flag 
Monthly 
concurrent 
RRS 
Monthly 
concurrent 
RRS using 
age-sex 
annual 
prospective 
RRS 
Annual 
prospective 
RRS using 
age-sex 
Comprehensive 
COM
P 9,020,836 52.52 0.42 0.97 0.99 0.91 1.56 1.50 1.56 
Exclusive Provider 
Organization EPO 2,283,966 45.44 0.49 1.00 0.89 0.67 1.23 1.17 1.21 
Health Maintenance 
Organization 
HM
O 62,994,492 45.69 0.44 0.98 0.91 0.71 1.25 1.20 1.24 
Point of Service POS 31,609,613 46.83 0.45 0.99 0.98 0.68 1.30 1.19 1.30 
Preferred Provider 
Organization PPO 183,185,128 46.35 0.48 0.84 0.70 0.73 1.27 1.23 1.26 
Point of Service 
with Capitation 
POS 
with 
cap 1,294,028 46.89 0.52 1.00 1.00 0.64 1.28 1.16 1.27 
Consumer Directed 
Health Plan 
CDH
P 13,757,554 46.46 0.46 1.00 0.94 0.67 1.28 1.14 1.26 
High Deductible 
Health Plan 
HDH
P 3,134,903 46.26 0.49 1.00 0.96 0.61 1.26 0.99 1.22 
All   307,280,520 46.45 0.47 0.90 0.80 0.72 1.28 1.22 1.27 
Notes: Sample is from the MarketScan Commercial Claims and Encounter Data. The sample of enrollees selects those who are: adults aged 21 to 64, 
enrolled for 60 months during 2007-2011, with non-missing age, gender, region, and have at least one month of plan type information in any year. 
Averages are calculated at the person-month level. Sample size is 307,280,520 person months. male is a dummy equal to 1 for male. RX flag and 
MHSA flag are dummies equal to 1 for pharmacy benefit coverage and mental health and substance abuse (MHSA) coverage, respectively. The last 
four columns show the four different relative risk scores, namely monthly concurrent relative risk score for current month, monthly concurrent 
relative risk score for current month using only age-sex, annual prospective relative risk score for 12 months prior to current month, and annual 
prospective relative risk score for 12 months prior to current month using only age-sex. Note that by construction, the annual prospective risk scores 
are available only for 2007-2011, thus the underlying sample is 245,824,416 person months. 
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Table 3.2 Per-service OOP Payment by Service Type – Before and After Oct 2010 
OOP=COPAY+COINS+DEDUCT 
Mean 
Before 
(Std.Dev) 
Mean 
After 
(Std.Dev) 
Difference 
in Mean 
Change in 
Percentage 
(%) 
Prevention office visits by new patients 13.39 5.57 -7.82*** -58.4 
 -1.34 -2.83   
Prevention office visits by established 
patients 12.57 4.99 -7.58*** -60.3 
 -1.23 -2.77   
Mammogram screenings  1.54 0.86 -0.68*** -44.1 
 -0.16 -0.36   
Flu shots 0.8 0.41 -0.39*** -49 
 -0.11 -0.09    
Obs 45 15 60 60 
Notes: Sample is from the MarketScan Commercial Claims and Encounter Data, including 
enrollees who are: adults aged 21-64, continuously eligible for five full years during 2007-2011, 
with non-missing age, gender, region, and have at least one month of plan type information in any 
year. Consumer’s out-of-pocket (OOP) payment is the sum of copayment, coinsurance payment, 
and deductible. For each service type, we first calculate the monthly mean payment by averaging 
per-service OOP payments across person claims to the month level. Then seasonality is taken out 
from the monthly data. We then average across months to compare payments before and after Oct 
2010. Since the same group of people are enrolled in each month, we do not distinguish between 
weighted and unweighted means here. For each service type, we exclude claims with outlier 
payment amounts, namely those with negative per-service OOP payments and those on and above 
the top 1% of the entire OOP payment distribution. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses 
in the first two columns. Test statistics in the third column are obtained from the two sample t-test 
for equal means. *** = p<0.01, ** = p<0.05, *= p<0.1 
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Table 3.3 Monthly Average Utilization Rate by Service Type – Before and After Oct 2010 
Utilization Rate (per 10,000 people) 
Mean 
Before 
(Std.Dev.) 
Mean 
After 
(Std.Dev.) 
Difference 
in Mean 
Change in 
Percentage 
(%) 
Panel A: Unweighted      
Prevention office visits by new patients 27.55 27.46 -0.09 -0.3 
 (32.61) (29.66)   
Prevention office visits by established 
patients 
253.37 287.63 34.25 *** 13.5 
 (122.10) (134.83)   
Mammogram screenings  295.01 314.78 19.77 *** 6.7 
 (134.69) (134.63)   
Flu shots 136.26 180.04 43.77 *** 32.1 
 (123.25) (150.85)   
Panel B: Weighted     
Prevention office visits by new patients 25.88 26.25 0.37 *** 1.4 
 (10.91) (11.02)   
Prevention office visits by established 
patients 
231.82 268.19 36.38 *** 15.7 
 (84.45) (99.52)   
Mammogram screenings  289.07 316.76 27.7 *** 9.6 
 (54.61) (50.29)   
Flu shots 122.32 174.77 52.46 *** 42.9 
 (93.57) (132.02)   
Obs 15,592 5,390 20,982 20,982 
Notes: Sample is from the MarketScan Commercial Claims and Encounter Data. The sample of 
enrollees selects those who are: adults aged 21 to 64, enrolled for 60 months during 2007-2011, with 
non-missing age, gender, region, and have at least one month of plan type information in any year. 
Utilization rate (per 10,000 population) is defined as [(# of persons in a given plan p in state s in time t 
receiving the service)/(# of total enrollees in a given plan p in state s in time t)]*10,000. For each 
service type, we first calculate individual's use of service at the month level, and then aggregate to the 
plan type-state-month level to calculate the utilization rate for a certain plan type in a certain state in a 
specific month, resulting in a sample size of 20,982. All health plan types are included in the sample, 
but plan type-state-month cells with fewer than 20 observations are dropped. Both weighted and 
unweighted means are reported. For office visits and flu shots, we weight by the total population in 
each plan type-state-month cell; for mammogram screenings, we weight by the number of eligible 
female enrollees in each plan type-state-month cell. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses in 
the first two columns. Test statistics in the third column are obtained from the two sample t-test for 
equal means. *** = p<0.01, ** = p<0.05, *= p<0.1 
 
  
Table 3.4 Predicted Health Plan Effects on Utilization Rates of Prevention Services 
Panel A        Base   model                   
 
New preventive office visits 
Established preventive office 
visits 
Mammogram screenings Flu shots 
 Diff Diff-in-Diff Diff  Diff-in-Diff Diff Diff-in-Diff Diff Diff-in-Diff 
PPO 9.16% ***   -0.14%    -0.18%    3.10%    
CDHP 8.69% *** -0.47%  5.62% *** 5.75% *** 4.65% *** 4.84% *** 7.25% *** 4.15% * 
HDH
P 12.20% *** 3.04%  6.41% *** 6.55% *** 0.78%  0.96%  -5.91% * -9.01% ** 
HMO 6.31%  -2.85%  -7.30% *** -7.16% *** -2.64%  -2.46%  -1.98%  -5.08%  
POS 7.40% ** -1.77%  -11.22% *** 
-
11.08% *** -6.16% *** -5.98% *** -5.92% * -9.02% *** 
Comp -6.57% * 
-
15.73% *** -11.12% *** 
-
10.98% *** 
-
13.75% *** 
-
13.56% *** 9.33% *** 6.22% ** 
Panel B                                                                          Complete model                   
 
New preventive office visits 
Established preventive office 
visits 
Mammogram screenings Flu shots 
 Diff Diff-in-Diff Diff Diff-in-Diff Diff Diff-in-Diff Diff Diff-in-Diff 
PPO 9.95% ***   1.55%    2.44% **   9.89% ***   
CDHP 9.92% *** -0.04%  5.71% *** 4.16% ** 5.90% *** 3.46% *** 11.33% *** 1.44%  
HDH
P 13.17% *** 3.22%  7.75% *** 6.21% *** 6.64% *** 4.20% *** 3.30%  -6.59% * 
HMO 7.51% * -2.45%  -3.87% * -5.42% *** 0.67%  -1.77%  8.91% *** -0.98%  
POS 8.23% *** -1.73%  -8.98% *** 
-
10.53% *** -4.23% ** -6.67% *** 0.82%  -9.07% *** 
Comp -8.71% ** 
-
18.66% *** -10.04% *** 
-
11.59% *** 
-
12.62% *** 
-
15.06% *** 14.38% *** 4.49% * 
Notes:  Results are based on the regression results shown in Table 3.A-1. All regressions use observations at the plan type-state-month level. Sample 
includes Comprehensive plans, HMO, POS, PPO, CDHP, and HDHP health plans that cover enrollees from all states in the US from 2007 to 2011. 
All state-plan type-month cells with fewer than 20 enrollees are excluded. The omitted plan type is PPO. Dependent variable is the log of utilization 
rate (per 10,000 population) for a certain service in plan type p in state s in month t. Utilization rate (per 10,000 population) is defined as [(# of 
persons in a given plan p in state s in time t receiving the service)/(# of total enrollees in a given plan p in state s in time t)]*10,000. For each 
service, utilization rates with a value of 0 are transformed to the 50% level of the minimum non-zero utilization rate for that service, making sure 
that (1) the transformed values maintain the original rank; and (2) all utilization rates after log transformation will have positive values. All 
regressions control for time trend, seasonality, plan and state fixed effects. The base model corresponds to Column (1) of Table 3.A-1. The complete 
  
model corresponds to Column (4) of Table 3.A-1, which additionally controls for average pharmacy benefits coverage and mental health and 
substance abuse coverage in plan type p in state s in month t, prospective and concurrent relative risk score within each plan type-state-month cell. 
By construction of prospective risk scores, the complete model only uses observations from 2008 to 2011. Diff represents each plan type's effects on 
utilization rates after Oct 2010 relative to before. Diff-in-Diff refers to the incremental effects on prevention utilization of each plan type (other than 
PPO) relative to PPO after Oct 2010 compared to before. *** = p<0.01, ** = p<0.05, *= p<0.1 
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2.6 Appendix A: Supplementary tables and graphs 
Table 3.6.A-1 Health Plan Effects on Utilization by Service Type  
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   
RX and MHSA 
coverage   X  X  X  
Prospective risk score     X  X  
Concurrent risk score             X   
Preventive office visits by new patients 
 Coef  Coef  Coef.  Coef.  
 
(Std. 
Err.)  (Std. Err.)  
(Std. 
Err.)  
(Std. 
Err.)  
Post 0.092 *** 0.094 *** 0.101 *** 0.100 *** 
 (0.019)  (0.019)  (0.019)  (0.020)  
Post*CDHP -0.005  -0.001  -0.002  0.000  
 (0.028)  (0.028)  (0.028)  (0.029)  
Post*HDHP 0.030  0.031  0.032  0.032  
 (0.036)  (0.035)  (0.037)  (0.037)  
Post*HMO -0.029  -0.026  -0.027  -0.024  
 (0.041)  (0.043)  (0.040)  (0.040)  
Post*POS -0.018  -0.014  -0.017  -0.017  
 (0.032)  (0.031)  (0.030)  (0.030)  
Post*Comp -0.157 *** -0.159 *** -0.181 *** -0.187 *** 
 (0.036)  (0.036)  (0.037)  (0.038)  
Obs      14,840    
       
14,840    
    
12,210    
     
12,210    
Preventive office visits by established patients  
Post -0.001  -0.001  0.018  0.015  
 (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.015)  (0.015)  
Post*CDHP 0.058 *** 0.060 *** 0.039 ** 0.042 ** 
 (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.017)  (0.017)  
Post*HDHP 0.065 *** 0.067 *** 0.062 *** 0.062 *** 
 (0.021)  (0.022)  (0.021)  (0.021)  
Post*HMO -0.072 *** -0.069 *** -0.058 *** -0.054 *** 
 (0.023)  (0.022)  (0.020)  (0.020)  
Post*POS -0.111 *** -0.109 *** -0.101 *** -0.105 *** 
 (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.019)  (0.019)  
Post*Comp -0.110 *** -0.109 *** -0.110 *** -0.116 *** 
 (0.030)  (0.030)  (0.031)  (0.030)  
Obs 17,026  17,026  14,058  14,058  
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(Table Continued) 
Mammogram screenings 
 Coef  Coef  Coef.  Coef.  
 (Std. Err.)  (Std. Err.)  (Std. Err.)  (Std. Err.)  
Post -0.002  -0.002  0.026 ** 0.024 ** 
 (0.010)  (0.011)  (0.010)  (0.010)  
Post*CDHP 0.048 *** 0.049 *** 0.033 *** 0.035 *** 
 (0.014)  (0.013)  (0.010)  (0.010)  
Post*HDHP 0.010  0.011  0.042 *** 0.042 *** 
 (0.016)  (0.017)  (0.015)  (0.015)  
Post*HMO -0.025  -0.024  -0.019  -0.018  
 (0.021)  (0.022)  (0.018)  (0.018)  
Post*POS -0.060 *** -0.060 *** -0.065 *** -0.067 *** 
 (0.019)  (0.019)  (0.017)  (0.017)  
Post*Comp -0.136 *** -0.134 *** -0.147 *** -0.151 *** 
 (0.014)  (0.015)  (0.019)  (0.021)  
Obs      16,926           16,926        13,967         13,967    
Flu shots 
Post 0.031  0.022  0.102 *** 0.099 *** 
 (0.019)  (0.019)  (0.020)  (0.020)  
Post*CDHP 0.042 * 0.053 ** 0.010  0.014  
 (0.022)  (0.023)  (0.022)  (0.022)  
Post*HDHP -0.090 ** -0.072 ** -0.064 * -0.066 * 
 (0.034)  (0.035)  (0.034)  (0.034)  
Post*HMO -0.051  -0.029  -0.013  -0.010  
 (0.031)  (0.032)  (0.031)  (0.031)  
Post*POS -0.090 *** -0.086 *** -0.087 *** -0.091 *** 
 (0.028)  (0.029)  (0.028)  (0.029)  
Post*Comp 0.062 ** 0.082 *** 0.052 * 0.045 * 
 (0.028)  (0.028)  (0.027)  (0.026)  
Obs      16,095           16,095        13,308         13,308    
Notes:  All regressions are based on observations at the plan type-state-month level. Sample includes 
Comprehensive plans, HMO, POS, PPO, CDHP, and HDHP health plans that cover enrollees from all 
states in the US from 2007 to 2011. All the state-plan type-month cells with fewer than 20 enrollees are 
excluded. The omitted plan type is PPO. Dependent variable is the log of utilization rate (per 10,000 
population) for a certain service in plan type p in state s in month t. Utilization rate is defined as [(# of 
persons in a given plan p in state s in time t receiving the service)/(# of total enrollees in a given plan p in 
state s in time t)]*10,000. For each service, utilization rates with a value of 0 are transformed to the 50% 
level of the minimum non-zero utilization rate for that service, making sure that (1) the transformed values 
retain the original rank; and (2) all utilization rates after log transformation will have positive values. All 
regressions control for time trend, seasonality, plan and state fixed effects. Column (1) is the base model. 
Column (2) additionally controls for average pharmacy benefits coverage and mental health and substance 
abuse coverage in plan type p in state s in month t. Column (3) also controls for prospective relative risk 
score within each plan type-state-month cell. Column (4) adds to the model a monthly concurrent relative 
risk score. Since prospective risk scores, by construction, use information from 12 prior months, Column 
(3) and (4) only use observations from 2008 to 2011. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** = 
p<0.01, ** = p<0.05, *= p<0.1  
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Figure 3.6-A-2 Average per-service OOP Payments by Service by Plan Type 
 
Notes: Graph shows the average per-service out-of-pocket (OOP) payments for the four preventive service 
types before and after Oct 2010, by health plan type. This figure is produced using the method as in Figure 
3.5, where the same sample is further divided by six plan types being studied here. 
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Figure 3.6-A-3 New and Established Office Visits Utilization CDHP and HDHP 
 
Notes: Graph shows the utilization per 10,000 people of preventive office visits by new and established 
patients during the 60-month period between 2007 and 2011, among enrollees in CDHPs and HDHPs in 
our sample. Figure is produced using the same method as in Figure 6 and 7, where sample is restricted to 
CDHPs and HDHPs enrollees.  
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2.7 Appendix B: Variable definitions 
2.7.1 Definition of health plan types 
The MarketScan database provides definitions on plan types that are used in our 
analysis. The following table summarizes the basic distinction between plan types33. With 
increasing generosity, HMO, POS, and PPO health plans manage care by directing 
consumers to certain provider network including introducing PCPs as gatekeepers. In 
contrast, CDHP and HDHP health plans impose relatively stronger cost sharing on the 
consumer side but emphasize consumer choice. 
Plan Type Patient 
incentive to 
use certain 
providers? 
Primary 
Care 
Physician 
(PCP) 
assigned? 
Referrals 
from PCP to 
specialists 
required? 
Out of 
network 
services 
covered? 
Partially or 
fully 
capitates? 
HMO Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
POS Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
PPO Yes No N/A Yes No 
CDHP Varies No N/A Varies No 
HDHP Varies No N/A Varies No 
 
2.7.2 Identification of preventive services  
Our identification of certain preventive services follows the CPT code guideline 
by AMA for cost-sharing waived preventive services. As shown in the table below, we 
focus on preventive services that do not involve diagnoses or secondary treatment. In 
                                                 
33 The table is collected from the MarketScan Commercial Claims and Encounters Database 2011 User 
Guide. 
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addition, for flu shots, we do not include influenza virus vaccines injected through noses 
(i.e. intranasal use) and other counseling services that are coded separately. 
Preventive Services Procedure Codes 
Office visit for preventive care, 18-64, new patients ‘99385’, ‘99386’ 
Office visit for preventive care, 18-64,existing patients ‘99395’, ‘99396’ 
Screening for breast cancer (mammography) ‘77052’, ‘77057’, ‘G0202’ 
Flu shots (intramuscular use) ‘90656’, ‘90658’, ‘90460’, 
‘90471’, ‘90472’, ‘G0008’ 
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